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Executive Summary
The telecommunications industry is undergoing rapid
change due to technological advances and deregulation. The
industry that began with the telephone now includes cable,
wireless and satellite communications, and the Internet.
California’s tax system has not kept pace with the telecom
munications industry. The myriad taxes and charges on
telecommunications in California were established for an in
dustry that was legally, technologically, and structurally very
different than it is today. Many taxes remain targeted to a
State Tax Notes, September 15, 2003

specific technology (for example, telephone taxes or cable
franchise fees), despite the blurring of distinctions between
technologies that provide similar services (for example, the
telephone and Internet telephony). The convergence of former
ly distinct communications technologies renders the existing
tax structure difficult to justify in terms of economic efficiency
or equity.
In this report, we review and analyze telecommunications
taxes and fees in California. The primary objectives of our
research were (1) to provide a comprehensive overview of the
telecommunications tax system in the state, including all taxes,
fees, and surcharges paid by telecommunications service
providers and their customers; and (2) to examine the economic
consequences of current tax policy, including inequity, inef
ficiency, and administrative complexity.

California’s tax system has not kept pace
with the telecommunications industry. The
conver ge nce of fo r m e r ly dis tinc t
communications technologies renders the
existing tax structure difficult to justify in
terms of economic efficiency or equity.
As policymakers at all levels of government confront the
challenge of reforming our tax system to encourage new tech
nology and broad access to various telecommunications ser
vices, including Internet access, while at the same time address
ing the needs of tax equity and revenue sufficiency, they must
first have a clear understanding of the current tax system and
the incentives it creates.
Tax Rates
We find that the cumulative tax rates (including all taxes,
fees, and surcharges) are higher for telecommunications ser
vices than other goods and services. The total tax rate on
intrastate services (for example, within-state long-distance)
ranges from 7.83 percent to 18.83 percent and includes the
federal excise tax of 3 percent, various statewide taxes and
surcharges totaling 4.83 percent, and a local tax that varies
across cities from zero to 11 percent.
The total tax rate on interstate services (that is, long-distance
calls to other states) is even higher, ranging from 10.28 to 21.28
percent or higher. This rate consists of the 3 percent federal
excise tax, a 7.28 percent federal universal-service charge
765
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(which is sometimes passed on to consumers at a higher rate),
and the zero to 11 percent local tax.
Equity
The distribution of the burden of current telecommunica
tions taxes is not equitable according to any accepted equity
principle. According to the benefit principle, the burden of a
tax should be distributed according to the benefits received
from the governmental activities financed by the tax. Many of
the taxes imposed on telecommunications are revenue-based,
and companies pass them along to consumers in proportion to
their expenditure. However, the benefit these taxpayers receive
from goods and services financed by these taxes is not linked
to their tax burden in any way, as would be required by the
benefit principle.
Furthermore, because the share of household income spent
on telecommunications decreases as household income in
creases, the telecommunications tax burden is distributed
regressively with respect to income. This violates the abilityto-pay principle, which holds that tax burdens should be dis
tributed among taxpayers according to their ability to pay,
typically as measured by income.
Finally, horizontal equity requires that taxpayers of equal
ability to pay bear equal tax burdens, which is impossible with
revenue taxation because taxpayers with similar incomes may
spend differing amounts on telecommunications.
Taxation Differences Across Technologies
Today there are many alternatives to the traditional wireline
telephone call, including wireless service and voice communi
cation over the Internet (Internet telephony). Our research
shows that the tax burden varies across technologies. For
example, traditional telephone companies are subject to a much
broader range of federal, state, and local taxes than are some
of their new competitors (for example, cable or satellite
providers).
Consumers of cable or satellite services do not pay the
federal excise tax or federal and state taxes and charges to
support universal service. The largest potential “leakage” for
voice communications is Internet telephony, which escapes
federal and state universal-service taxes, the federal excise tax,
and the local utility tax.
Other potential sources of discriminatory tax treatment are
local franchise fees, which cable companies pay and local
exchange carriers do not, and property tax laws. The property
of most telephone carriers is state-assessed annually at market
value, while cable television companies are locally assessed
with annual increases in assessed value limited to 2 percent.
There is little economic justification for these differences in
treatment across technologies, because efficient taxes (which
introduce the least distortion in consumer and producer
decisions) depend on the demand for the final service
produced, not on the technology underlying the service. Favor
ing one technology over another may reduce consumer and
producer welfare over time.
Efficiency
Efficient economic outcomes maximize the total economic
benefits received by consumers and firms. Excess burden, the
term for the inefficiency caused by a tax, is the loss in a
taxpayer’s well-being above and beyond the tax revenue col
lected. Taxation of revenue causes excess burden because the
higher prices that result decrease consumption of telecom
766

munications services. The decrease in consumption and sub
sequent excess burden will be greater when taxing services
such as cellular as compared with local-access service because
cellular consumers are more sensitive to price changes. Excess
burden is a pure efficiency loss in the economy, reducing the
consumers’ economic benefits by more than the amount of tax
revenue that the taxing authority gains.
We estimate, very conservatively, that the current set of
telecommunications taxes leads to at least a 4 percent efficien
cy loss, or excess burden, in California. We show that the
efficiency loss can be reduced without affecting tax collections
by raising the tax rate on revenue from local exchange access
(whose demand is relatively insensitive to price) and lowering
the rates on other services, such as long-distance and wireless
communication.
The existing tax structure may also result in efficiency losses
that compound over time — dynamic efficiency losses. Dis
crimination among telecommunications firms or between
telecommunications companies and other companies distorts
the rates of return on investment across companies, thereby
reducing the economic benefits realized from the growth of the
telecommunications industry and its various components.
Consumption Distortions
Consumers’ choices between competing telecommunica
tions services are affected by differences in taxes on these
services. Consumers today have many avenues to avoid the
taxes on traditional service. For example, Internet telephony
services escape all telecommunications taxes, and consumers
consequently have an added incentive to switch to Internetbased telephony. As consumers switch from taxed to untaxed
services, federal, state, and local governments will see their tax
revenues decline.
Differences Across Locations
Telecommunication costs vary among cities and counties in
California due to variations in the local utility user tax (UUT)
and local franchise fees. The UUT rate ranges from zero to 11
percent across cities; the UUT tax base also varies.
Our comparison to neighboring and other large states shows
that California has a greater number of state telecommunica
tions taxes, which raises administrative and compliance costs
for telecommunications companies doing business in the state.
California, however, does not impose relatively higher tax rates
on telecommunications. Telecommunications taxes, therefore,
probably play a negligible role in business or household
decisions to locate in California, but may influence the siting
choices of some heavy users of telecommunications within the
state.
Conclusions and Recommendations
Telecommunications represents a major path by which fu
ture economic growth will continue to travel. Although the
telecommunications industry is currently a relatively small part
of California’s overall economy — about 2 percent (measured
by income) — it has been growing rapidly and contributing
significantly to economic growth as it raises the productivity
of a wide range of other industries. Hence, its total impact on
the economy is much greater than its size suggests.
As noted, California’s tax system has not kept pace with the
telecommunications industry. Technological developments
and deregulation have resulted in new entities that do not fit the
traditional definition of telecommunications providers under
State Tax Notes, September 15, 2003
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state tax laws. This situation results in differing treatment of
businesses competing to provide the same service. The current
treatment of the industry violates basic principles of good
taxation; in that it is inefficient, inequitable, and creates exces
sive administrative and compliance costs.
If developing the telecommunications infrastructure, and
hence the economy as whole, is a goal of state economic policy,
then tax policy should support this goal by encouraging (or at
least not discouraging) investment in California’s telecom
munications industry.

California should extend the manufacturers’
investment credit and sales tax exemption for
new equipment purchases to telecommunica
tions companies.
Although our chief objective has been to present informa
tion rather than to advocate particular reforms, we conclude by
suggesting a few improvements our analysis points to. These
may lay the groundwork for potential reform of California’s
telecommunications tax system. Some of these recommenda
tions can be implemented unilaterally by the state. Others
require California to cooperate with local governments or with
other states.
California should extend the manufacturers’ invest
ment credit (MIC) and sales tax exemption for new
equipment purchases to telecommunications com
panies. The primary purpose of the MIC and sales tax
exemption on equipment purchases is to avoid the
pyramiding of taxes that can occur when both the inputs
used to produce goods and services and the goods and
services themselves are subject to the sales tax. While not
subject to the sales tax, telecommunications services are
subject to other taxes that total more than the sales tax.
Because the MIC is intended to encourage investment,
there is no reason for excluding telecommunications,
given their importance in the New Economy.
California should examine whether the income ap
portionment rules for its corporate franchise and
income taxes are appropriate for telecommunications
services. All states must cooperate to ensure that multistate income is being apportioned to the proper states to
avoid double taxation.
California should work with other states and the
federal government to establish new nexus guidelines
for the Information Age. Federal Public Law 86-272
limits a state’s power to tax an out-of-state company’s
income from sales of tangible property within the state,
when the property is shipped from out of state. This law
should be broadened to cover intangibles, such as
telecommunications and Internet services, and extended
to other types of taxes.
California should, in cooperation with its local gov
ernments, simplify and consolidate the various taxes
and charges imposed on end-user revenues by local
jurisdictions and the Public Utilities Commission.
California telecommunications customers currently pay
State Tax Notes, September 15, 2003

seven different statewide taxes, fees, or surcharges in
addition to the federal excise tax and universal-service
charges, and possibly a local utility user tax on their
purchases of telecommunications services. Consolida
tion of statewide charges would significantly reduce the
administrative burden of telecommunications companies
in the state. Switching to a simple per-line charge to fund
universal-service programs would result in fewer con
sumption distortions, less excess burden from taxation,
and greater efficiency. If nonuniform rates are desired,
long-distance service should be taxed less than local
service to minimize the efficiency loss caused by taxation
(which is the opposite of the current tax structure).
California should encourage local jurisdictions to
unify the local utility user tax. The compliance burden
on telecommunications companies could be significantly
reduced if local jurisdictions were to adopt a uniform rate
and base for the utility user tax.
California should establish uniform assessment of
business property. Neither the assessed value of busi
ness property nor the allocation of the property tax reve
nue from a particular property should be dependent upon
who assesses it. Market-value assessment would be the
most equitable and efficient method.
California should urge local governments to examine
their local franchise fees. Local franchise fees should
be set to cover no more than the costs to local govern
ments of managing public rights-of-way, not to fund
general municipal budgets. All providers of telecom
munication services should be equally subject to these
minimal franchise fees so as to avoid competitive ad
vantages that influence the future development of new
technologies.
California and other states should urge the federal
government to clarify issues regarding Internet and
cable telephony. Currently, telephone calls placed over
the Internet are not subject to federal, state, or local taxes,
and thus enjoy a competitive advantage. As the quality
of such calls improves, more consumers will switch,
which may lead to decreased economic efficiency and
reduced government revenues. Certain forms of cable
telephony raise unresolved issues regarding the ap
plicability of the franchise fee and whether the property
is subject to state or local assessment.
California and other states should monitor and work
with the federal government in its efforts to restrict
state and local tax systems. Maintaining a competitive
ly neutral tax system in California may require expanding
the tax base to include previously untaxed services, such
as In ter net acces s. C u r r en tly, fe de r a l and s t ate
moratoriums prevent such reforms.
California should work with local governments to
provide uniform relief for low-income individuals
and households. Th e t axe s cu rr ently imposed on
telecommunications services are regressive: Taxes rep
resent a larger percentage of a low-income household’s
income than a high-income household’s. A few cities
offer UUT exemptions for low-income individuals, and
767
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some relief from statewide surcharges exists, but the
relief is not uniform.
Social And Economic Consequences
Of Existing Telecommunications Tax Policy
In this section, we examine the social and economic conse
quences of the existing tax policy. Given the importance of
telecommunications to the modern social fabric, there are
undoubtedly many social implications of tax policy that are
outside the scope of this project. We focus on a few issues
relating to the equity of the current tax policy regarding
telecommunications. We also consider the economic conse
quences of the taxes, discussing administrative costs and the
static and dynamic efficiency losses from the current tax struc
ture.
Equity
Central to most notions of good taxation is that taxes should
be equitable. Oddly, there is no simple definition of “equity”
that sets a clear legal standard for taxation in the United States.
Therefore the term “equitable” may mean very different things
to different interest groups. Below we discuss different con
cepts of equitable taxation, as they apply to equity among
consumers and equity between telecommunications providers
and end-users.
Equity Among Consumers
In this section we discuss three of the more common notions
of equity among legal theorists and apply them to current
telecommunications tax policy: the benefit principle, the
ability-to-pay principle, and the horizontal-equity principle.1
The benefit principle. According to the benefit principle,
the burden of a particular tax should be distributed according
to the benefits that taxpayers receive from the government
activities financed by the tax. A tax in the present context that
clearly violates the benefit principle is the federal excise tax
(FET) levied on tel ecommun icat ions. B ecau se n eit her
telecommunications providers nor their customers benefit dis
proportionately from the broad range of goods and services
financed in the federal budget, the benefit principle implies that
there is no rationale for the FET. However, the benefit principle
is sometimes cited to justify taxing telecommunications ser
vices when the revenue is used to fund telecommunicationsrelated programs, such as universal-service programs.
The presence of positive network externalities is often cited
as justification for universal-service programs. Network exter
nalities exist when the benefits of the telecommunications
network to any individual subscriber increase as the number of
subscribers increases. Therefore, all subscribers to the network
benefit from the addition of a single subscriber. Some
proponents of universal service argue that because telecom
munications users are the primary beneficiaries of network
expansion through universal service, then according to the
benefit principle they should bear the burden of financing these
programs.
This argument is deficient on several counts. While the
theory behind the network externalities idea is formally correct,

1
See Rakowski (2000) for a good overview of the benefit and ability-to-pay
principles (albeit in a different taxation context). He refers to the ability-to-pay
principle as a particular case of the “fair sacrifice” doctrine.
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it probably has little actual relevance in California today. First,
in a highly developed country like the United States, with a
high household telephone penetration level (95.1 percent
nationwide, 97.0 percent in California), anyone picking up a
telephone can reach hundreds of millions of other subscribers.
The value of one more subscriber to any one user is virtually
zero.2 In the few cases in which adding a new subscriber would
be of benefit to a particular existing subscriber (perhaps be
cause the new subscriber is a relative or friend), the argument
for private subsidization is stronger than that for public sub
sidization.3
In fact, non-negligible network externalities are likely to be
found, if anywhere, among lower-income and rural com
munities of subscribers — communities whose members are
ostensibly being added to the network by universal-service
programs. A straightforward application of the benefit principle
would place a relatively higher taxation burden on these com
munities, which is obviously not the actual practice.

It is not at all clear that those who consume
mor e te le c o m m unic a tions s e r v ic e s
necessarily benefit more than those who
consume fewer.
The other main problem with using the benefit principle to
justify universal-service funding mechanisms is that it is not at
all clear that those who consume more telecommunications
services necessarily benefit more than those who consume
fewer. Recall that the universal-service taxes are revenue taxes,
not per-line charges. Why should the benefit received from
using the network be directly proportional to the amount of
money spent on telecommunications (that is, the number or
duration of calls)? Those who espouse the network externality
argument for universal service often mention the “option
value” externality: even if an existing user never calls the new
subscriber added to the network, the existing user still benefits
because of the option to call the new subscriber. The option has
value, even if it is not exercised. Again, while this argument is
formally correct, the magnitude of the option value is probably
minuscule in most cases. More germane to the present argu
ment because the option value does not correspond to revenue
(at all, if the option remains unexercised), the benefit clearly
cannot be proportional to realized telecommunications reve
nue. Thus, using the benefit principle to justify revenue taxa
tion for universal-service purposes is an informal argument that
careful analysis does not support.
The emergency telephone service (911) fee could also be
justified as a charge that benefits telecommunications users.
The argument here would rest not on network externalities but
on social externalities. If there is value to society from an
individual being able to use a telephone in case of a police, fire,
or medical emergency, then telephone network access creates
social externalities beyond the purely private benefits to the

2

Belinfante (2002), Tables 1 and 2, pp. 6 and 8.
Crandall and Waverman (2000) argue against network externalities as a
justification for universal-service programs at all.
3
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caller. Again, however, the benefit principle rests not on merely
identifying externalities or benefits, but on linking the burden
of taxation to the accrual of the benefits. Once again, there is
little reason to think that the social externalities created by
universal 911 access are proportional (or even correlated at all)
with the expenditure by an individual on telecommunications.
The current system of financing universal and emergency
services from revenue taxes, as opposed to flat charges, can be
justified by the benefit principle only if the benefits can be
linked directly to expenditure, which clearly cannot be done.
Another problem with using the benefit principle to justify
the 911 fee is that its revenue is not used solely to fund 911
services. As Andal (1996) points out, the funds collected are
deposited into an account in the state’s general fund. Because
it is a general fund account, it has periodically been raided to
support non-telecommunications obligations.4
Finally, co nsider the u til ity use r taxes (UUTs) that
municipalities may place on telecommunications. Businesses
and individuals benefit directly or indirectly from a range of
public goods and services provided by state and local govern
ments, such as a judicial system, police and fire protection,
roads, and schools. But there is no evidence that telecom
munications providers and their customers receive special
benefits from these services or impose higher costs to justify
higher tax burdens for providing these services than are faced
by other businesses or consumers. The benefit principle pro
vides no rationale for imposing higher income, property, or
transactions taxes on this industry.
We close this section by noting that none of our arguments
here should necessarily be construed as arguments against
telecommunications taxation. We are merely pointing out that
careful analysis leads us to conclude that any attempt to justify
such taxation by appealing to the benefit principle is illreasoned at best and deceptive at worst. The true motivation
underlying revenue taxation appears to be redistributive in
nature (that is, the more affluent should subsidize the less
affluent).
The ability-to-pay principle. The ability-to-pay principle
holds that tax burdens should be distributed among taxpayers
according to their ability to pay, typically as measured by
income. The incidence of a tax is often measured in terms of
the percentage of income paid in taxes. A tax is said to be
regressive if the percentage of income paid in tax falls as
income rises, proportional if the percentage of income paid in
taxes stays the same as income rises, and progressive if the
percentage of income paid in taxes rises as income rises. Strict
adherence to the ability-to-pay principle requires proportional
taxation, although policymakers often use the ability-to-pay
principle loosely to justify progressive, redistributive taxation
as well. Regressive taxes violate the ability-to-pay principle by
any definition.
Evidence suggests that the consumer burden of telecom
munications taxes is distributed regressively with respect to

income. In fact, the Congressional Budget Office reports that
the burden of the FET is distributed even more regressively
than federal taxes on alcoholic beverages and tobacco, two
taxes widely believed to be highly regressive.5 To show that ad
valorem (revenue-based) taxation of telecommunications is
regressive, one need merely note that the share of income spent
on telecommunications decreases as the income of the
household increases. A constant revenue tax rate plus a decreas
ing share of income devoted to telecommunications services
means that higher-income households bear proportionately less
burden than do low-income households. Using 1998 figures
from the Consumer Expenditure Survey, Cordes, et al. (2000)
calculate that the share of telecommunications taxes paid by
households with annual incomes less than $40,000 exceeds
these households’ shares of total income. For example, al
though households earning $5,000 to $10,000 annually have
only 1.8 percent of total income in the United States, they bear
6 percent of the telecommunication tax burden — a highly
regressive outcome. These calculations apply to any revenuebased form of taxation, be it federal, state, or local.
The horizontal equity principle. A subcomponent of the
ability-to-pay principle is the horizontal equity principle,
which states that among taxpayers of equal ability to pay, the
tax burden should also be equal. Clearly, horizontal equity is a
necessary but not sufficient condition to satisfy the ability-to
pay principle described in the previous section. Ad valorem
taxation violates the principle of horizontal equity (and there
fore the ability-to-pay principle) if subscribers of similar in
comes spend differing amounts on telecommunications, which
is clearly the case. If the horizontal equity and ability-to-pay
principles are to be taken seriously, then the current revenue
taxation should be replaced with income-based taxation. In
other words, by drawing the funding for universal service from
the general income tax system, we would come closer to
satisfying the ability-to-pay principle than does the current
system of telecommunications-specific revenue taxation.
Equity Between Telecommunications
Providers and Subscribers
Another equity consideration is the division of the tax
burden between telecommunications providers and their sub
scribers. Given that there is no objective measure of equity
between consumers and firms (especially so, given that con
sumers, as stockholders, are also the owners of the firms),
“fairness” here is perhaps nothing more than what the median
voter believes it is. Here, we confine ourselves to pointing out
that the legal incidence of the tax (that is, the party upon whom
the tax is legally levied) may be strikingly different than the
economic incidence of the tax (who actually pays the tax).
In the simplest textbook arguments, the legal incidence of
the tax bears no relation whatsoever to the economic incidence,
which is determined solely by the responsiveness of supply and
demand to price changes.6 The intuition is that even if the law
5

U.S. Congressional Budget Office (1987).
From the textbook model (which assumes homogeneous products and
competitive supply) one derives that the share of the tax burden borne by
consumers is εS/(εS + |εD|), where εS is the elasticity of supply and |εD| is the
magnitude of the elasticity of demand. The elasticity of supply is the percentage
change in quantity supplied due to a 1 percent increase in price; the elasticity
of demand is the percentage change in quantity demanded due to a 1 percent
increase in price (see also following note).
6

4
Andal (1996) points out that in fiscal 1991 and 1992, $23 million was
taken from the State Emergency Telephone Number Account. In fiscal 1993,
$15 million was diverted to the general fund, and in fiscal 1994, $11 million
was diverted. The California Assembly Utilities and Commerce Committee
concluded that the approved upgrading of 911 facilities in 25 counties was
delayed in 1993-94 because of the fund diversions.
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requires the firms to pay the tax, they will shift at least part of
the burden on to consumers through higher prices. The extent
to which businesses are able to shift the tax burden forward to
consumers in the form of higher prices depends in part on how
sensitive consumers are to changes in price — a concept
e conomi st s term t he price el asticity of demand.7 Th e
preponderance of evidence suggests that consumer demand for
telecommunications services is relatively inelastic compared
with supply elasticities.8 In this case, it is likely that consumers
will bear a larger share of the tax burden on telecommunica
tions services than do the providers.
Efficiency
The main contribution of economic theory to the field of
taxation is an emphasis that some forms of taxation are more
efficient than others. The key insight is that whenever taxes
distort economic decisions made by producers and consumers,
they impose efficiency costs on the economy. Simply put, some
of the potential economic benefits that could accrue to
producers or consumers are thrown away when there is ineffi
cient taxation. Whenever a tax system is inefficient, a more
efficient system could raise the same tax revenue with less
economic harm done to consumers and firms. Another implica
tion of inefficiency is that a more efficient tax system could
raise more tax revenue and do no more harm to consumers and
firms than the current system does. In this section, we discuss
three areas of concern in California: the lack of administrative
simplicity, static efficiency, and dynamic efficiency in the
current telecommunications tax system.
Administrative Simplicity
In California, the evidence indicates that the current taxation
system places higher administrative and compliance costs on
telecommunication firms than on other types of firms. The
more taxes, fees, surcharges, and excises that are levied on a
good, the more administration (accounting, database, and bill
ing costs) is required to comply with the law. Similarly, the
more tax jurisdictions to which a firm is subject, the more
administration is required. These administrative costs are pure
losses to the economy because they are expenses incurred
without creating anything of value for society and they take
resources (such as labor, computer processing and storage, etc.)
away from other productive uses. This notion is completely
independent of the value of the programs funded by the taxes.
According to the Council on State Taxation (2002a), the
number of taxes imposed on telecommunications businesses
nationwide is more than three times the number imposed on
non-telecommunications vendors (391 versus 118). Further

7
The price elasticity of demand is a measure of the response of the quantity
demanded to a change in price. Specifically, it is the percentage change in
quantity demanded resulting from a 1 percent increase in price. If consumers
do not alter their consumption very much in response to a price change, they
are said to have an inelastic demand.
8
The elasticity of telecommunications demand depends upon the service
considered. Given that the bulk of telecommunications expenditure is on local
and long-distance service, and that both of these have been consistently
measured to have inelastic demand (highly so, in the case of local service), it
does not abuse the facts to speak of “telecommunications,” as a composite
good, as having inelastic demand. See Taylor (1994) for a review of elasticity
estimates for various telecommunications services. Supply elasticities are
harder to come by, but in a competitive market in the long run, theory suggests
they are nearly infinite (and therefore certainly larger than demand elasticities).
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more, telecommunications providers must deal with 929 more
transaction tax bases and 6,956 more taxing jurisdictions than
businesses in other sectors. The result is that in 2001 a
full-service telecommunications provider, operating nation
wide, had to file a mind-boggling 66,918 tax returns compared
with 8,284 for sellers of most other goods and services.
Static Efficiency
Telecommunications taxes may distort consumers’ and
producers’ decisions by driving a wedge between the price the
consumer pays for the service and the revenue the firm keeps
for providing the service. The wedge raises prices for con
sumers and lowers the net revenue for the firms. The distortions
in c onsumers’ a nd firms’ consumption and production
decisions result in efficiency losses. These losses are static, in
the sense that their calculation takes current consumer tastes
and producers’ technology and productive capacity in the in
dustry as given. Dynamic inefficiencies, discussed next, occur
if the tax structure distorts the formation of consumer tastes,
firms’ investment decisions, or the progress toward competi
tion in the industry.

In California, the evidence indicates that
the current taxation system places higher
administrative and compliance costs on
telecommunications firms than on other
types of firms.
If telecommunications taxes and charges raise the price of
telecommunications services relative to other goods and ser
vices, consumers may respond by consuming fewer telecom
munications services. When consumers or businesses alter
their behavior in response to taxes, an excess burden is
generated — a loss of economic well-being above and beyond
the tax revenues collected.9 The magnitude of this excess
burden increases in proportion to the magnitude of the con
sumer response, as measured by the price elasticity of demand.
An important aspect of excess burden is that it increases
geometrically with the tax rate. In particular, the excess burden
from a revenue tax rises with the square of the tax rate. This
implies, for example, that doubling a tax rate from 1 percent to
2 percent creates four times as much excess burden and forgone
economic surplus. Estimates of the excess burden under the
current tax system and under some alternatives are explored
below.
Excess Burden From the Current
State Telecommunications Tax System
Assessing the costs and benefits of the current telecom
munications tax system in the state requires at least an estimate
of the excess burden (EB) of the taxation. Standard formulas
for approximating the excess burden of a tax require knowing
the tax rate, the market revenue generated by the good, and the
elasticity of demand. The simplest formula to estimate the loss
in consumer benefits from a revenue tax of rate t on a set of N
different services is as follows:

9

Excess burden is also termed “deadweight loss” by economists.
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N

1
EB = t2∑εiRi
2
i=1

where:
t is the revenue tax rate,
εi is the elasticity of demand for service i with respect to
its own price,
and Ri is the market revenue (not the tax revenue) of
service i.10
In this section we use this formula to estimate the forgone
consumer benefits caused by the current set of telecommunica
tions taxes. The figures we calculate are underestimates of the
true lost economic benefits, for two reasons. First, the formula
above implicitly assumes that all tax revenue is returned to
consumers (or equivalently, that the governmental goods and
services funded by the tax revenue are valued as highly as
receiving the tax revenue as income would be). Second, we do
not include lost producer benefits in the calculation.11 Estimates
of excess burden that include lost producer benefits may be
extraordinarily larger. For example, in a similar calculation of
excess burden in a different context, Prieger (1998) found that
lost-producer benefits from telecommunications revenue taxa
tion may be 10 to 26 times as high as lost-consumer benefits.
These numbers will fall as the competitiveness of the supply
side of the telecommunications market increases.
Table 1 (see next page) contains the results of our calcula
tions. The main types of intrastate telecommunications services
included in the calculation are basic local exchange service,
intraLATA and interLATA toll calling, special-access services,
and mobile wireless calling. Due to lack of data we cannot
include such services as Internet access and cable telephony.
Given that excess burden is nonlinear in the tax rate, the
incremental damage to efficiency from state and local taxes is
higher than it otherwise would be without the FET. The first
line of Table 1 shows that the FET destroys about $2.5 million
in potential economic benefits per year. The incremental losses
from state taxes are in the next line; the state fees of 4.83 percent
destroy another $14.6 million in potential benefits. Adding the
median rate (5 percent) for the local UUT brings the incremen
tal losses from state and local taxes to $43.3 million.12 Finally,
if the UUT is set at the maximum observed rate in California
(11 percent), the incremental excess burden from state and local
taxes rises to $96.1 million annually, or about 4 percent of the
state and local tax revenue assumed to be raised in the calcula
tions.
As we mentioned above, these efficiency losses are under
estimates, because they do not include lost producer benefits.
Including this part of the excess burden may raise the figures
substantially. Hausman (1999), in an excess burden calculation
that includes the producer side, has estimated that state and

10
The formula is an approximation because it ignores income effects,
higher-order (curvature) terms in the demand function, and cross-price effects.
It also assumes that marginal cost (MC) is constant, although MC need not be
known. This formula is commonly used by practitioners. See Auerbach (1985)
for a discussion of formulas to measure excess burden.
11
Estimating lost producer benefits requires knowledge of price and
marginal cost, neither of which (particularly the latter) is easily available to us.
12
Five percent is the median UUT rate among localities with a UUT greater
than zero.
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local telecommunications taxes on wireless services result in
an excess burden that averages roughly 50 cents for each dollar
of revenue raised (at a 14.5 percent tax rate), which is about 12
times the highest loss we calculate.13 Hausman’s percentage
efficiency loss is higher than our calculation in part because he
considers only wireless service, which has high demand elas
ticity relative to most other telecommunications services. Even
so, our figure of 4 percent efficiency loss overall appears to be
extremely conservative.14 For example, using the range of 10
to 26 times as much producer losses as consumer losses men
tioned before, the efficiency loss would range from 38 percent
to 98 percent of the tax revenue raised. These figures are only
meant to be suggestive because they are based on producer
losses estimated in another context.
Cordes, et al. (2000) provide another estimate of the excess
burden. They claim that “the additional layer of federal, state,
and local taxes imposed on long-distance services and wireless
telephony could impose an excess burden of as much as $7
billion” on the nation. Prorating at California’s population
share of 12 percent in the nation leads to an excess burden for
the state of about $888 million. Their estimate includes inter
state as well as intrastate services; even so, our excess-burden
calculations again appear to be quite conservative.
Alternative 1: Rebalancing tax rates. The message of the
preceding paragraphs is not necessarily that telecommunica
tions taxes are undesirable because they create excess burden.
Excess burden is merely part of the cost side of the cost-benefit
analysis of any tax system. Even if the benefits are determined
to justify the costs, the tax system could be restructured to
reduce the inefficiency, while raising the same amount of tax
revenue. This subsection and the next explore such alternatives.

To equalize marginal excess burdens, tax
rates must be higher on services for which
demand is inelastic and lower on services
for which demand is elastic.
Casual inspection of the formula for excess burden in the
previous section reveals that relatively inelastic goods (for
which the ε in the equation is small) generate less excess burden
than do relatively elastic goods (for which ε is larger). This
implies that telecommunications services should not all be
taxed at the same rate, because their demand elasticities are not
equal. The most efficient tax system is one that raises needed
revenue with the least excess burden possible. The rule for
optimal commodity taxation (the Ramsey Rule) states that in
order to minimize overall excess burden, the additional (mar
ginal) excess burden of the last dollar of revenue raised from
each commodity must be the same. To equalize marginal excess
burdens, tax rates must be higher on services for which demand
is inelastic, and lower on services for which demand is elastic.

13
Hausman (1999) uses a different formula for the consumer side of the
calculation, based on log-linear demand and the compensated demand function.
14
Especially so, given that we are not breaking out high-elasticity services
like second phone lines, Internet access, and DSL in the calculations. See
Cordes, et al. (2000) for elasticity estimates for some of these other services.
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Table 1
Excess Burden (Efficiency Loss) From the Current State and Local Telecommunications Tax System
Taxes Included in Calculation

Cumulative Revenue
Tax Rate

Annual Excess Burden on Consumers ($Millions)
Total

Incremental Over FET

Federal Excise Tax (FET)

3.00%

$2.50

—

FET + State Fees

7.83%

$17.06

$14.55

FET + State Fees + Median UUT (5%)

12.83%

$45.80

$43.29

FET + State Fees + Maximum UUT (11%)

18.83%

$98.65

$96.14

Notes: The services included in the calculation are basic local exchange service, intraLATA and interLATA toll calling, special-access
services, and mobile wireless. Calculations use the formula in the text. Revenues used in the calculations are from Cavazos and Eisner
(2001). Elasticity data are from Hausman (1997b) (wireless) and Prieger (1998) (all others).

The empirical literature on telecommunications demand
suggests that elasticities vary widely across different services.
Basic local exchange service has nearly completely inelastic
demand. Demand for long-distance toll calling and wireless
services is more responsive to price, and has higher elasticity.
Applying the rule for optimal service-specific tax rates, then,
implies that basic local exchange access should be taxed at a
higher rate than other services. The optimal rebalancing tax
rates are presented in Table 2 for three scenarios. In all
scenarios, we assume that $777 million in tax revenue must be
raised, which is about the revenue from the current state
telecommunications tax of 4.83 percent.15
For illustrative purposes, Scenario A in Table 2 ignores the
federal excise tax (FET). The service-specific tax rates that
raise the required revenue and that minimize excess burden
(according to the above formula) range from 10.5 percent on
local exchange access to less than 1 percent for wireless and
toll calling. Because local access has highly inelastic demand,
it bears the greatest burden. Excess burden totals $770,000 in
Scenario A.
In Scenario B, the excess-burden calculation includes the
losses from the FET. However, the FET rate is assumed to be
out of the control of the state-level policymaker, so that only
the state tax rates can be adjusted. In this case, if negative tax
rates (that is, subsidies) are not allowed, then the optimal rates
are zero for all services except local access. Excess burden
totals $3.7 million in Scenario B (including the effect from the
FET). Compare this amount with the estimated (incremental)
excess burden of $14.6 million from the current state taxes in
Table 1: Rebalancing the service-specific rates leads to only a
quarter as much excess burden.
In Scenario C, the rebalancing rates are not constrained to
be positive. If subsidies are allowed, then the optimal state rates
for the non-access services are negative. These rates are nega
tive to “undo” part of the 3 percent FET, because the optimal
cumulative rates are less than that. In this scenario, the excess
burden falls to about $2 million, nearly halving the efficiency
losses in Scenario B.
These calculations show that efficient taxation calls for the
lion’s share of the revenue to be raised from local exchange
access. Thus, a charge like the current SLC (a per-line charge

15

This figure is based on California intrastate revenue of $16.09 billion in
1999 (Cavazos and Eisner, 2001).
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on local access) is an efficient one. Even better, perhaps,
would be to broaden the tax base, as we explore in the next
section.
Alternative 2: Expanding the tax base. Because the
excess burden in the preceding formula increases with the
square of the tax rate, one often hears calls to broaden the
revenue base on which a tax is applied, to reduce the tax rate
and the excess burden. It is true that if there are no preexist
ing taxes, then the broadest revenue base possible results in
the least efficiency loss. However, when there are preexist
ing taxes, broadening the revenue base may not improve
efficiency. Here we explore two scenarios: broadening the
state telecommunications tax base to include all telecom
munications revenue, and including all revenue from any
source.
First, consider removing the restriction that the state tax
be levied only on intrastate revenue. Then the tax base
increases from the 1999 figure of $16.1 billion to $22.1
billion. Increasing the base allows the state tax rate to be
reduced. However, because the federal taxes already levied
on interstate revenues are not in the control of California
policymakers, any extension of state taxes to interstate
revenues will increase the (already high) tax rates on inter
state telecommunications services. For simplicity, consider
the case in which all services will be taxed at the same rate.
The result is labeled Scenario D in Table 3 (p. 774). Although
the state tax rate drops from 4.8 percent to 3.5 percent, the
excess burden increases. The efficiency gains of $5.2 mil
lion from the decreased tax rates for intrastate services are
outweighed by the extra efficiency losses of $17.8 million
from interstate services. Unilateral broadening of the tax
base by state actors, without readjustment of the federal
telecommunications tax system, cannot improve consumer
welfare.
Similarly, broadening the telecommunications tax reve
nue base to include all revenue to which the general sales
tax applies cannot improve efficiency either, given that the
sales tax rate in California is already set at an average of 7.5
percent (refer to “Overview of Current State and Local
Telecommunications Taxes in California” in the full report;
to obtain, contact the California Policy Research Center). To
demonstrate, we create Scenario E, in which the revenue
requirement of $777 million is to be raised by a tax levied
on all intrastate telecommunications services and on all
goods and services currently subject to state sales tax. We
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Table 2
Decreasing Excess Burden (Efficiency Loss) Through Rebalancing Tax Rates

Scenario

Service
Local Exchange Access*

A

Rebalancing
Tax Rates
— No FET

Demand
Elasticity

Intrastate
Revenue
($M)

FET
Rate

Rebalanced
State Tax
Rate

Rebalanced
Cumulative
Tax Rate

Excess
Burden
($M)

0.02

6,764

0.0%

10.5%

10.5%

0.743

IntraLATA Toll

0.4

1,282

0.0%

0.4%

0.4%

0.005

InterLATA Intrastate Toll

0.72

3,858

0.0%

0.2%

0.2%

0.009

Mobile Wireless

0.51

4,193

0.0%

0.3%

0.3%

0.013

6,764

3.0%

10.9%

13.9%

1.298

9,333

3.0%

0.0%

3.0%

2.443

Total

B

C

Rebalancing
Tax Rates
— FET, No
Subsidies
Allowed
Rebalancing
Tax Rates
— FET, No
Restrictions

Local Exchange Access*
All other services

16,097
0.02
—

Total

0.770

16,097

3.741

Local Exchange Access*

0.02

6,764

3.0%

13.7%

16.7%

1.884

IntraLATA Toll

0.4

1,282

3.0%

-2.4%

0.6%

0.011

InterLATA Intrastate Toll

0.72

3,858

3.0%

-2.6%

0.4%

0.019

Mobile Wireless

0.51

4,193

3.0%

-2.5%

0.5%

Total

16,097

0.028
1.942

* Revenue for local exchange access includes CLEC revenue.
Notes: Elasticity is defined to be |%∆Q/%∆P|. The revenue data are from Cavazos and Eisner (2001). Elasticity data are from Hausman
(1997b) (wireless) and Prieger (1998) (all others). Excess-burden figure is calculated using the formula in the text, and includes the effect of
the FET where applicable. Rebalanced cumulative tax rates are applied to an adjusted revenue figure for each service. The percent change
in revenue resulting from the new tax rates is estimated as %∆P + %∆Q, which is approximated by ∆t*(1-ε), where t is the tax rate. The tax
revenue requirement is $777 million.

assume an omnibus elasticity of 1.0 for sales-taxable goods and
services. The tax base increases to about 30 times the exist
ing amount, which allows the state telecommunications tax
rate to drop from 4.8 percent to a mere 0.17 percent.16 Again,
however, the efficiency gains from the decreased tax rates for
intrastate telecommunications services are outweighed by the
extra efficiency losses from general goods and services: excess
burden would increase enormously under Scenario E.
Inefficiency increases in Scenario E because demand for
telecommunications services tends to be more inelastic than for
other goods and services. Recall that telecommunications ser
vices are currently not subject to state sales tax, and that the
cumulative tax rate on intrastate services is about 7.8 percent,
close to the state sales tax rate. Thus in Scenario E, starting from
a point of roughly equal tax rates for telecommunications
services and other goods, we raise the tax rate on the relatively
elastic good (non-telecommunications goods) and lower it on
the inelastic good (telecommunications). That is the opposite
direction of rebalancing toward optimal rates. Once again,
broadening the tax base does not necessarily improve consumer
welfare when there are other taxes already in existence.
We close this section noting some caveats regarding
Scenario E. Recall that we have not included the producer side
of the excess-burden calculation. If we did, and if price-cost

16
The current sales tax base was taken to be $440 billion, based on an
extrapolation of available data for 2001 (California State BOE, Taxable Sales
in California (Sales & Use Tax), 2001, 1st and 2nd quarter).
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margins are higher in telecommunications than they are for
other goods and services, then the efficiency gains from the
telecommunications services in Scenario E would be relatively
larger. Given that we do not have data on margins, we cannot
pursue this avenue. Furthermore, if we had data on revenue
from newer services such as DSL and cable modem service,
which have higher elasticity of demand, the efficiency gains
from the telecommunications services in Scenario E would also
be relatively larger.
Finally, it is important to note that if we use the maximum
intrastate rate of 15.83 percent (state tax + FET + UUT of 11
percent), then expanding the tax base as in Scenario E may
reduce the excess burden from taxation. Whether it does
depends on the tax revenue requirement assumed. The more tax
revenue that must be raised to “pay off” localities in lieu of their
UUT revenue, the higher the final uniform tax rate must be, and
the lower the potential efficiency gains.17 Therefore, the poten
tial gains from expanding the tax base to include all sales-tax
able revenue depend on both the extent to which policymakers

17
In particular, if the revenue requirement is kept at $777 million (the
amount raised by current state telecom taxes), as it is in Scenario E, replacing
the existing state and local telecommunications taxes of 15.83 percent with a
uniform lower rate of 0.17 percent decreases excess burden by $9.8 million.
However, if the revenue requirement is increased to $2.548 billion (the amount
raised by the assumed 15.83 percent state and local tax rate on intrastate
revenue), replacing the existing state and local telecommunications taxes of
15.83 percent with a uniform lower rate of 0.56 percent increases excess burden
by $126 million.
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Table 3
Changes in Excess Burden (Efficiency Loss) Through Expanding the Tax Base

D

Add Interstate Telecommunications
Service to State Telecom Tax Base

Scenario

0.02

6,764

4.83%

3.00%

3.51%

6.51%

-0.13

IntraLATA Toll

0.40

1,282

4.83%

3.00%

3.51%

6.51%

-0.49

InterLATA
Intrastate Toll

0.72

3,858

4.83%

3.00%

3.51%

6.51%

-2.63

Mobile
Wireless

0.51

4,193

4.83%

3.00%

3.51%

6.51%

-2.03

16,097

Interstate Toll

0.72

Mobile
Wireless

0.51

Total
Add All Sales-Taxable Revenue
to State Telecom Tax Base

Sales Taxable Revenue

Intrastate
Revenue

Incremental
Excess
Burden
($M)

Local
Exchange
Access*

Subtotal

E

Proposed
Cumulative
Tax Rate

Revenue
($M)

Subtotal
Interstate
Revenue

Proposed
State
Telecom
Tax Rate

Demand
Elasticity

Service

Intrastate
Revenue

Current Current
State Tax Federal
Tax Rate
Rate

Local
Exchange
Access*

-5.27

490

—

10.28%

3.51%

13.79%

1.06

5,499

—

10.28%

3.51%

13.79%

16.72

5,989

17.77

22,086

12.50

440,000

7.50%

0.00%

0.17%

7.67%

56.95

0.02

6,764

4.83%

3.00%

0.17%

3.17%

-0.09

IntraLATA Toll

0.40

1,282

4.83%

3.00%

0.17%

3.17%

-0.34

InterLATA
Intrastate Toll

0.72

3,858

4.83%

3.00%

0.17%

3.17%

-1.84

Mobile
Wireless

0.51

4,193

4.83%

3.00%

0.17%

3.17%

-1.42

Subtotal

16,097

-3.69

456,097

53.26

Total

* Revenue for local exchange access includes CLEC revenue.
Notes: “Current State Tax Rate” for sales-taxable revenue includes the 7.25 percent state sales tax and an assumed 0.25 percent local
assessment. See notes to Table 11.

are willing and able to reform the current system, and on the
tax revenue requirement. Were this option to be pursued,
analysis of the gains from expanding the tax base should be
further explored on a proposal-by-proposal basis.
Dynamic Efficiency and Horizontal Equity
Among Providers
The preceding paragraphs dealt with questions of static
efficiency, in which technology and consumers’ preference are
taken as given. Over time, however, technology and prefer
ences change. Technology changes as firms invest and in
novate, and tastes change as consumers learn about and become
comfortable with new products and services. When technology
and tastes change merely because taxes distort the prices that
consumers face and the profits firms receive, then questions of
dynamic efficiency arise. Here we focus on the potential
problems for investment incentives that unequal taxation of
telecommunications firms might cause.
The theory of efficient investment and taxation. The eco
nomic theory of how taxation affects investment and dynamic
774

efficiency is large, but a few principles stand out. First, dynamic
productive efficiency requires that the rates of return be equal
ized across assets. Required for this is equalization of effective
tax rates across assets (where effective tax rates are a function
of pre- and post-tax rates of return).18 Second, productive
efficiency is generally desirable, even when distortionary taxa
tion (such as revenue taxation, which changes asset prices)
must be used.19

18

Jack and Viard (1996).
Productive efficiency is required for absolute economic efficiency (what
economists term the “first best”). Even when distortionary taxes (those that
change assets’ values and prices) are unavoidable, the “second best” — the
most efficient outcome possible, given that distortionary taxation must be used
— also requires productive efficiency under certain conditions (Diamond and
Mirrlees, 1971). Even when those technical conditions are not satisfied,
moving toward productive efficiency generally improves economic welfare
(Auerbach 1982, 1989). Thus, productive efficiency is generally desirable
under a wide range of circumstances.
19
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Various forms of taxation (corporate income taxes, sales
taxes, revenue taxes, property taxes, per-line fees, etc.) affect
the rates of return on assets through at least two channels.20
First, taxes can change the “user cost of capital,” which is the
opportunity cost of investing in a particular capital good. The
user cost of capital might change because a tax investment
credit (such as the manufacturers’ investment credit (MIC) in
California) changes the effective purchase price of capital, or
because taxes lower net cash flows resulting from the invest
ment (through corporate income taxes, for example). Second,
the rate of return on an asset is lowered when the (net) price of
the output service produced with the asset falls, due to taxation
of revenue or sales.
Therefore, the tax system will cause an efficiency loss if it
discriminates among telecommunications firms (based on the
technology used to deliver telecommunications services), or
between telecommunications companies and other companies,
in ways that change their rates of return. By altering the rates
of return on investment, taxes can distort the growth of the
telecommunications industry. For example, everything else
being equal, more resources will be devoted to the least-taxed
technology than would be in the absence of taxation.
Horizontal equity among telecommunications firms. There
is evidence that the existing tax structure does not affect all
types of telecommunications providers equally. Traditional
providers of telecommunications services, such as telephone
companies, are subject to a much broader range of federal,
state, and local communications taxes than are some of their
new competitors, such as cable or satellite providers. Con
sumers of cable or satellite services do not pay the FET or the
myriad federal and state taxes and charges to support universal
service. Some local governments do, however, include cable
services in their UUT base.

There are currently no data available to
measure the extent to which consumers are
s u bs titu ting I n te r n e t for tr ad itio nal
te le c o mmunic a tio ns , but it is s u r e to
increase with improvements in the quality
and ease of use of Internet telephony.
The current funding mechanisms for state and federal
universal service treat different providers of voice communi
cation more equally. For example, if a cable company offers
local exchange service, it must register with the California
Public Utilities Commission as a competitive local exchange
carrier and then becomes subject to universal-service taxes.
The largest potential “leakage” with respect to voice commu
nications is Internet telephony. As described in the introductory
section (and in Appendix A of the full CPRC report, “The
History of Telecommunications in California: From Monopoly
to Deregulation, a March Toward Technological Conver
gence”), Internet telephony may be a substitute for the tradi

20
This paragraph follows Auerbach (1983). See his article for an explicit
equation for the rate of return of a taxed asset.

State Tax Notes, September 15, 2003

tional telephone network, and calling may be accomplished by
the end-users themselves without any company contributing to
universal service involved. If the universal-service tax rates
keep rising, this leakage of tax revenue can only be expected
to increase as Internet telephony becomes more accessible and
user-friendly.
If the tax system discriminates based on the technology used
to deliver telecommunications services, then the dynamic ef
ficiency losses discussed in the previous subsection (The theory
of efficient investment and taxation) will result. Unfortunately,
we do not have the data (or an accepted methodology from the
literature) to estimate the magnitude of these potential losses
over time. Suffice it to say that dynamic losses are often much
larger than static-efficiency losses, given that the effects of
distortions compound over time, and that the potential welfare
is higher when technology and the product mix can change.
In Appendix D of the full report, “Comparison of Telecom
munications Tax Obligations,” we summarize the distinctions
that the current system of taxation makes between telecom
munications firms. As in the rest of this report, we focus on
providers of two-way voice communication. Table D-1 in the
appendix provides a comparison of the local, state, and federal
taxes imposed on different types of telecommunications busi
nesses in California. All telecommunications businesses,
regardless of technology, are treated similarly regarding the
state sales tax and the corporate franchise (income) tax. Dis
crimination across technologies occurs in the imposition of the
numerous federal, state, and local taxes, surcharges, and fees
based on end-user revenues, and the property tax.
State regulatory surcharges, taxes, and fees are imposed on
the intrastate end-user revenues of all traditional wireline local
and long-distance service providers in the state, as well as
wireless mobile service providers. Similarly, all interstate enduser revenues of these providers are subject to the FET and
federal universal-service fees. Paging (and other one-way com
munications services) and payphone services are exempt from
the state (but not the federal) taxes. The local UUT also applies
to intrastate, interstate, and wireless services in most jurisdic
tions that impose the tax. (See the second section of the full
report, “Overview of Current State and Local Telecommunica
tions Taxes in California,” and Appendix C, “Utility User Tax
Information”).
Internet-telephony services escape all of these taxes and
consequently enjoy a competitive advantage. Consumers of
telecommunication services, particularly interstate services,
have an incentive to switch to Internet-based telephony to avoid
the high combined tax rate on traditional services. In the second
section, we found that this rate is as high as 25.5 percent in
some California cities. Recall that such tax-induced distortions
in consumption lead to efficiency losses. In particular, the
availability of a close substitute to traditional telecommunica
tions services increases the price elasticity21 of demand for
traditional services and, hence, the excess burden due to taxa
tion.
There are currently no data available to measure the extent
to which consumers are substituting Internet for traditional
telecommunications, but it is sure to increase with improve

21

See footnote 7.

775

(C) Tax Analysts 2003. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim copyright in any public domain or third party content.

Special Report / Viewpoint

ments in the quality and ease of use of Internet telephony.
Another consequence of concern to federal, state, and local
governments is the decline in revenue from these various taxes
and the potential impact on the programs they fund.
Another potential source of discriminatory tax treatment is
the local franchise fee. Cable companies pay franchise fees for
the privilege of providing specialized services, as well as for
the right to use public rights of way to lay their cables. In
contrast, LECs are exempted by the state from paying such
fees. However, as was previously mentioned, this exemption
has been recently challenged as telephone companies have
expanded to offer cable and information services. This dis
criminatory treatment and uncertainty regarding the exemption
may result in dynamic efficiency losses if local telephone
companies delay — or are discouraged from adding — cable
services for fear of losing their state franchise exemption.

An ar gu men t coul d b e m ade for either
annual state assessment at market value for
all telecommunications companies, defined
broadly to include all companies providing
competitive services, or local assessment for
all.
Telecommunications companies are also treated differently
under California’s property tax laws. Currently cable television
companies are locally assessed, while most telecommunica
tions companies (LECs, CLECs, wireless) are state-assessed.
Although there is no evidence that the current assessed values
of either type of company would change significantly if their
assessment status were switched, the perception of either cur
rent or future differences may influence firm activity. For
example, a cable television company contemplating offering
telecommunications services might be discouraged from doing
so because it fears higher property taxes as a consequence. All
of the taxable property of the cable company would be centrally
assessed, not just the portion affiliated with the offering of
telecommunications services. If the entire company was sub
jected to state assessment, it would lose whatever Proposition
13 protection that it had, either real or perceived. This reluc
tance may be justified if the market value of the company’s real
assets is expected to increase faster than 2 percent a year.
By a similar argument, the cable company that is currently
locally assessed may be able to maintain a property tax ad
vantage over any potential new entrant due to the acquisition
value basis of assessment. Thus, to foster competition and level
the playing field regarding property tax obligations, an argu
ment could be made for either annual state assessment at
market value for all telecommunications companies, defined
broadly to include all companies providing competitive ser
vices, or local assessment for all.
Either solution, however, could have a significant impact on
local government revenues because, under current law, proper
ty tax revenues from state-assessed and locally-assessed
property are allocated much differently. State-assessed unitary
values are allocated by the BOE to a countywide tax rate area
in each county where the assessed has property. These revenues
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are then allocated by statutory formula to all local entities
within the county. Revenues from county-assessed property, on
the other hand, are distributed only to those local jurisdictions
in which the particular property is situated. Therefore, a shift
of all telecommunications companies to either state or local
assessment would affect property tax receipts of local govern
ments.
The issue of state versus local assessment has been recently
addressed by the BOE as it applies to the electricity industry.
In the board’s most recent ruling, amended Rule 905, it was
decided that all large electricity-generating facilities should
be state-assessed. A law recently enacted in California re
quires that the revenues derived from the assessment of this
property be allocated in the same manner as revenues derived
from locally assessed properties.22 This solution levels the
playing field between existing and new electricity-generating
facilities and provides at least a modicum of incentive for local
governments to site these facilities within their borders.
Horizontal equity between telecommunications and other
businesses. Many of the state and local taxes imposed on
telecommunications providers and their customers are unique
taxes that do not apply to other businesses. Cline (2002) es
timates that current taxes paid by telecommunications com
panies and their customers in California are three times higher
than the taxes they would pay if they were taxed under the same
state and local system that applies to general businesses.23
California ranks third highest, among all states, in Cline’s
measure of tax inequity between telecommunications firms and
other companies.
State assessment of telecommunications companies appears
to single out the telecommunications industry for adverse tax
treatment, compared to other businesses in the state. If telecom
munications companies are subject to state assessment at
market value, while other businesses are locally assessed (with
Proposition 13 protection), then the rates of return of these two
groups are distorted and productive efficiency is impaired.

The MIC, unavailable to telecommuni
cation s com panies, als o dis advan tages
t e l e co m m u ni ca t i o n s fi rm s rel a t i ve t o
companies in other lines of business.
The MIC, unavailable to telecommunications companies,
also disadvantages telecommunications firms relative to com
panies in other lines of business. In addition to the arguments
for extending the MIC to telecommunications companies that
we discussed in the full report in “Overview of Current State
and Local Telecommunications Taxes in California,” we can
now add productive efficiency to the list. Optimal investment
tax credits equalize rates of return on assets.24 Thus, unless
22
AB 81, signed June 20, 2002; chaptered at sections 100.9 and 721.5 of
the California Revenue and Taxation Code. (For the full text of AB 81, see Doc
2002-15358 (3 original pages) or 2002 STT 128-4.)
23
These excess tax calculations exclude corporate income and franchise
taxes, do not consider potential differences in business property assessments
or property tax depreciation schedules, and assume that telecommunication
services would continue to be exempt from the state and local sales tax.
24
Jack and Viard (1996).
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Table 4
Comparison of Telecommunications Transaction Taxes in California and Selected States
Number of
Local Taxes

Number of
State Taxes

Total Tax
Rate

Number of
Tax Bases

Arizona

3

5

0.1313

18

205

California

2

7

0.1228

17

2,440

State

Number of
Returns

Florida

1

1

0.163

1

1

Nevada

6

3

0.0289

7

194

13

8

0.0853

23

120

New York

5

8

0.1726

10

5,623

Oregon

1

4

0.132

86

1,017

Texas

3

8

0.2856

4

3,107

Washington

8

5

0.1926

12

4,446

National Average

3

4

0.139

54

1,312

New Mexico

(risk-adjusted) rates of return for telecommunications com
panies are believed to be higher than for manufacturers in
general, telecommunications companies should be extended
the same investment credit. While ILECs might enjoy higher
rates of return than some manufacturers, CLECs (at this time)
almost certainly do not, and face higher risk as well.
Concluding Remarks on Efficiency
To conclude this section on efficiency, we again emphasize
that the inefficiencies of the current tax system are only the cost
side of a full cost-benefit analysis. Although taxes impose
efficiency costs on the economy, they may be warranted by the
programs they fund. Against the costs of the tax system, then,
must be weighed the purported benefits ensuing from the
distribution of the tax revenue.

California is tied with Colorado, Illinois, and
Louisiana for the second-highest number of
state taxes on telecommunications sales
nationwide: seven.
For example, the excess burden generated by universalservice taxes and surcharges should be compared to the bene
fits of these programs. A recent FCC report shows that the
CPUC has exceeded its goal of a 95 percent penetration rate in
California. It is reported that 97 percent or more of all Califor
nia households were subscribing to telephone service in 2001,
almost 2 percentage points above the national average of 95.1
percent.25 The benefits of this network expansion are, however,
not easily measured, and there is little evidence that the size of
the network would decrease much if the universal-service
programs were not in effect. See Appendix E of the full report,
“Universal Service in California,” for more detailed informa
tion on the ubiquity of basic local exchange service in Califor
nia.

Even if policymakers or society determines that the benefits
of programs funded under the current tax system outweigh the
costs, the message from our calculations above is that the same
benefits could be realized more efficiently. Whatever the taxrevenue requirements are determined to be, rebalancing the tax
rates, reducing administrative complexity, and leveling the
playing field for different types of telecommunications firms
can improve the efficiency of the tax system.
California Compared With Other States
In our earlier discussion on administrative simplicity, we
noted that an overly complex tax system may be economically
inefficient. How does California measure up to other states with
regard to telecommunications taxation?26 Some dimensions
along which to judge the complexity of the state’s tax system
are the number of distinct taxes, the overall level of the taxes,
the number of tax bases, and the number of taxing jurisdictions.
The number of taxes is the number of legally distinct telecom
munications taxes. For example, the Universal Lifeline
Telephone Service charge and the California High-Cost FundA fee are two different state taxes (where we are using the term
“taxes” to include all taxes, fees, and surcharges). The overall
level of the taxes is the sum of the rates of all the various taxes.
The base of a tax is the specific set of services to which the tax
applies. For example, the base for the state universal-service
taxes is all intrastate services, while the base for a utility user
tax may be local and long-distance calling revenue, but not
cellular revenue.27 Finally, the number of taxing jurisdictions
is the number of legal, governmental, or administrative entities
that tax telecommunications.28 Because each jurisdiction re
quires at least one tax return to be filed, the more jurisdictions
there are, the more tax returns need to be filed.
The overall picture shows that California has a relatively high
number of state taxes and jurisdictions, although it does not have
a relatively high average tax rate. The following data are obtained

26

This section draws on COST (2002a, 2002b).
See Appendix C in full report for the many ways the utility user tax base
is defined in the state.
28
Taxing jurisdictions include the state, counties, cities, and special tax
districts.
27

25

Belinfante (2002), tables 1 and 2, pp. 6 and 8.
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from the 2001 COST report and the Ernst & Young LLP report
(Cline, 2002), to which we added clarifications. Table 4 (pre
vious page) provides a summary of this information.
Number of Local Taxes. California has two local taxes
that apply to revenues from the sale of telecommunica
tions services: the utility user tax (UUT) and the local
franchise fee. Although California does have a statewide
local sales tax and local-option sales tax, these apply only
to equipment, not services.29 Nationwide, the average
number of local taxes is three. Thirty-six states have more
than California — the highest being New Mexico with
13. Among the neighboring states, only Oregon, with
one, has fewer than California. Arizona has three, while
Nevada has six. New York has five; Texas has three.
Number of State Taxes. California is tied with Colorado,
Illinois, and Louisiana for the second-highest number of
state taxes on telecommunications sales nationwide:
seven.30 Only New Mexico, New York, and Texas have
more, each with eight. Arizona and Washington each
have five, Oregon has four, and Nevada has three. The
national average is four.
Total Number of Taxes. California is tied with Mississip
pi, Nevada, and Virginia for the sixth-highest number of
total taxes on telecommunications sales nationwide:
nine. New Mexico leads the nation with 21, while New
York, Washington, and Illinois each have 13. Texas has
11, Nevada 9, Arizona 8, and Oregon 5.
Total Tax Rate. California’s total state and local tax rate
on telecommunications sales (which COST calculates to
be an average of 12.28 percent) is just below the median
rate among all states, and is below the 13.9 percent
national average.31 However, as mentioned before, the
state and local tax rate can range from 4.83 to 15.83
percent on intrastate services and from 7.28 to 18.28
percent on interstate services, depending on the UUT.
Among neighboring states, Oregon (13.2 percent) and
Arizona (13.13 percent) have slightly higher average tax
rates than California. Nevada has a combined state-local
rate of 2.89 percent. The highest rates nationwide are in
Virginia, with 29.77 percent, and Texas, with 28.56 per
cent. Washington also makes the top 10, with 19.26
percent. New York’s rate is 17.26 percent.
Excess Tax Rates. If telecommunications were taxed like
any other service in the state, taxes on the industry would
be only one-quarter their present amount. Most of this
difference is due to the fact that services, in general, are
not subject to the sales and use tax. In this sense, about
75 percent of all telecommunications taxes in the state
are excess taxes that exceed taxes generally imposed on

29

COST (2000a) reports that California has four local taxes that apply to
telecommunications sales. They include the local sales tax and a local 911
emergency per-line fee imposed only within the city and county of San
Francisco.
30
COST (2002a) reports California with eight, but they include the state
sales tax, which applies only to equipment, not services.
31
Using different methodology, Cline (2002) estimates that total state and
local telecommunications taxes in California are 6.4 percent of industry reve
nue, which puts the state in the lowest decile.
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other service-sector businesses and their customers.
Only Montana, New Hampshire, and the District of
Columbia, have higher excess tax percentages. Of neigh
boring states, only Oregon (with 74 percent excess taxes)
ranks near California. Arizona and Nevada both have
excess taxes below the national average of 39 percent.
Total Tax Bases That Must Be Maintained. California
ranks 11th in terms of total tax bases that must be main
tained by telecommunications companies with 17, 15 of
which are local tax bases. This is the highest number of
tax bases among the 10 largest states. The neighboring
states of Oregon, with 86, and Arizona, with 18, both beat
California. Missouri earns the number one spot with 781.
Washington has 12, New York 10, Nevada 7, and Texas
4. The national average is 54, and the national median is
six.
Number of Tax Returns and Taxing Jurisdictions.
California ranks eighth in the nation in total number of
tax returns that must be filed by telecommunications
companies: 2,440. California ranks seventh in the num
ber of taxing jurisdictions, with 824. The national
average number of tax returns and taxing jurisdictions is
1,312 and 298, respectively.
Thus, as shown by its high rankings in many of these
categories, California appears to be ripe for simplification of
its telecommunications tax system. Even though the tax rates
are not out of line with other states, the large number of taxes,
tax bases, and particularly jurisdictions leads to administrative
complexity, with its attendant costs, as previously mentioned.
Reforms
In this section we describe recent telecommunication taxreform efforts by the federal government and other states as
well as reforms proposed by various interest groups and
stakeholders.
Recent Reforms
Recent reform efforts, mostly outside California, include the
following (in chronological order).
In a 1994 suit, MCI claimed that it had been denied equal
protection under the personal property tax law in Ohio.32
MCI’s personal property was taxed at 88 percent of
market value, while the property of its competitors was
taxed at 31 percent of market value. In February 1994,
the state supreme court ruled in favor of MCI, stating that
it should be taxed similarly to other businesses. In addi
tion, a comprehensive tax reform study was undertaken
in 1994 that included a detailed analysis of Ohio’s
telecommunications taxes. Effective in 1995, personal
property of long-distance companies is assessed at 25
percent of value. Property of local exchange carriers
added to the tax rolls during 1995 and thereafter is also
assessed at 25 percent. All existing property — property
on the tax rolls before 1995 — will continue to be
assessed at 88 percent of value. Property of competitive

32
MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. Limbach, Tax Commr., 68 Ohio St.
3d 195; 1994 Ohio 489; 625 N.E.2d 597 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1994). (For the
full text of the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision, see 94 STN 42-22.)
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local phone companies will be assessed in the same
manner as that of the incumbent local providers.33
In 1996, New York undertook a major review of telecom
munications taxes in response to successful litigation
brought by AT&T.34 This state has since modernized its
statutes.
Kentucky’s Task Force on Utility Tax Policy commis
sioned Barents Group, a consulting firm, to provide
background information and analyze the taxation issues
related to the deregulation of utilities and the communi
cations industry.35
Maine created a task force to study telecommunications
taxation in 1997. The task force was asked to review the
state’s sales and personal property taxes as they apply to
telecommunications businesses, identify disparities
among service providers, compare the tax treatment of
telecommunications firms with that of other firms, and
evaluate strategies to clarify laws and ease adminis
tration. Their report was published in 1999.

(P.L. 106-252) was signed into law on July 28, 2000.37
The act addresses the sourcing problem by sourcing all
wireless calls and mobile telecommunications services
to the “place of primary use,” which is essentially the
user’s address. To date, 16 states, including California,
have enacted conforming legislation. Only the state or
local taxing jurisdictions encompassing the place of
primary use can tax the calls or service.
In one of the most sweeping reforms to date, Florida
repealed 11 separate taxes and fees and replaced them
with a single state and a single local communications
services tax in 2000. During 2001, the state enacted
follow-up legislation establishing a revenue-neutral tax
rate for the replacement taxes. The new taxes became
effective October 1, 2001.
In 2001, North Carolina eliminated the gross receipts tax
imposed on local communications services, changed the
sales tax rate to 6 percent on all taxable telecommunica
tions services, and expanded the base of the sales tax on
communications services.38

In 1999, Montana reduced property taxes for large
telecommunications providers and introduced a new ex
cise tax on all providers to cover the lost revenue. Before
this change, the property of large telecommunications
companies was centrally assessed and taxed at the rate of
12 percent. In contrast, the property of smaller telecom
munications providers was not centrally assessed and
was taxed at 6 percent. The 1999 legislation reduced the
taxable valuation rate of centrally assessed telecom
munications property from 12 to 6 percent. It also imple
mented a broad-based telecommunications excise tax,
set at a rate of 3.75 percent of the sales price of telecom
munications services, to offset the lost property tax reve
nue. Three-quarters of the excise tax revenues are cur
rently used to reimburse local governments for lost
property tax revenue, and 25 percent goes into the state’s
general fund.

Minnesota enacted legislation in 2001 providing for a
sales tax exemption for machinery and equipment used
to provide telecommunications services.39

South Carolina passed legislation in 1999 allowing cities
to collect franchise fees from local providers through
2003. Companies that were not required to pay franchise
fees, such as wireless providers, were assessed a 0.3
percent business tax.

Reform Proposals
Below we describe and comment on some of the more
c om mon reforms that have bee n proposed by various
policymakers, task forces, interest groups, and stakeholders.
Corporate Franchise Tax

In a coordinated effort that extended over a three-year
period, the wi reless telecommunications industry
worked with a number of state and local government
organizations (including the National Governors’ As
sociation, the National Conference of State Legislatures,
the Federation of Tax Administrators, the Multistate Tax
Commission, and the National League of Cities) to pur
sue federal legislation that provides a uniform method to
determine the situs36 of a cellular telephone call for tax
purposes. The Mobile Telecommunications Sourcing Act

In 1997, the California Franchise Tax Board (FTB) is
sued draft regulations to provide special apportionment
rules for telecommunications and related businesses in
an attempt to have the property factor include key assets
of these companies and what the FTB perceived as a
more appropriate sourcing rule for sales.42

33

McHugh (1996).
See http://www.tax.state.ny.us/Statistics/Policy-Special/Telco/Back
ground/Telco-Back_Contents.htm.
35
See Barents Group (1999).
36
The location of property, for purposes of determining whether a given
property tax applies.
34
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Also in 2001, Tennessee eliminated the discriminatory
property tax treatment of local communications carriers
and increased the sales tax on telecommunications ser
vices.40
Legislation to repeal the 3 percent FET was introduced
during 2001 in both the House and Senate, but no action
has been taken.
Illinois enacted the Simplified Municipal Telecom
munications Tax Act on February 8, 2002. This legisla
tion replaced three municipal taxes with a new centrally
administered “simplified municipal telecommunications
tax” and also provided for a vendor compensations
allowance.41

37

For the text of the act, see http://www.wow-com.com/pdf/uniform_072800.pdf.
2001 North Carolina HB 571, SB 1005. (For the full text of HB 571, see
Doc 2001-11930 (16 original pages) or 2001 STT 88-14.)
39
2001 Minnesota HF 1. (For the full text of HF 1, see Doc 2001-22347
(433 original pages) or 2001 STT 165-18.)
40
Tennessee SB 1484, HB 864, enacted as Pub. Ch. 195. (For the full text
of HB 864, see Doc 2001-13281 (22 original pages) or 2001 STT 97-36.)
41
2001 Illinois SB 88, enacted as P.A. 92-0526. (For the full text of SB 88,
see Doc 2001-29019 (98 original pages) or 2001 STT 226-11.)
42
See “Overview of Current State and Local Telecommunications Taxes
in California” in the full report for the details of this proposal.
38
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There have been various proposals and suggestions to
update P.L. 86-272 to provide guidance on when a mul
tistate business is subject to any state tax and to apply the
guidance to more than just businesses that sell tangible
goods. For example, the federal Advisory Commission
on E l e c t r oni c Com m e r c e propos e d ne w ne xu s
guidelines, and a few bills have been introduced in
Congress over the years, such as S.664 (107th Congress).
COST and others43 have suggested that more states
should provide sales tax exemptions for equipment pur
chased by telecommunications companies. California
has a limited sales tax exemption that only applies to
certain new businesses and not to telecommunications
companies. In lieu of a sales tax exemption, California
has a manufacturers’ investment credit (MIC) that ap
plies against state franchise taxes. However, this credit
also does not apply to telecommunications companies.
Various groups have suggested that the MIC be expanded
to also apply to telecommunications service providers
(see discussion below on the sales tax exemption).
Sales and Use Tax
Extend sales and use tax exemptions and income tax
credits (the MIC) for manufacturing equipment to equip
ment used to provide telecommunications services.44
Over the years, there have been suggestions to broaden
the sales tax base and lower the rate. Such a change
eliminates the need to deal with problematic exemptions
because every sale would be subject to taxation. Some
have proposed, along with the broader base, that a sales
tax exemption be granted to purchases by businesses to
eliminate cascading of the tax.45 Should such a proposal
be considered in California, it would be useful to analyze
whether the broader base (including telecommunication
services) could produce revenues to replace the multi
tude of current taxes and fees that apply to telecom
munications.
Property Tax
Assess all business property, including that of telecom
munication companies, at market value. This would
eliminate the potential differences in treatment of state
versus local assessees, and the attendant possible
dynamic inefficiencies discussed earlier. Assessment of
all business property at market value would also remove
the artificial advantage that older locally assessed
property enjoys over newer locally assessed property.
Keep depreciation rate schedules up to date to best reflect
rapid technological change.
Franchise Fees
Various groups have suggested eliminating the multitude of
fees and taxes imposed on telecommunications services and

43
See “Proposal For State and Local Taxation of the Telecommunications
Industry,” submitted to the Advisory Commission on Electronic Commerce on
November 15, 1999, by 12 telecommunications companies, available online at
http://www.ecommercecommission.org/proposal.htm; and Palladino and
Mazer (2000), p. 20.
44
COST (2002a) and Palladino and Mazer (2000).
45
See McLure (1999).
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replacing them with either a single tax, or a single state tax and
single local tax.46 As explained by the National Governors’
Association:
States need to examine the patchwork of local taxes and
fees imposed on telecommunications firms. Most states
grant the authority to impose these taxes and fees by
statute, and, therefore, states can make any necessary
changes. One step states can take is to consolidate the
number of fees and taxes imposed, possibly collapsing
them into one local fee to cover all expenses incurred by
local governments to manage rights-of-way. This could
be done as local revenue is maintained while simplifying
fee administration.47
Utility User Tax
As with franchise fees, various groups have suggested
eliminating the multitude of fees and taxes imposed on
telecommunications services and replacing them with
just one or two taxes.
Provide a uniform base across all jurisdictions that levy
the telephone user’s tax.
Universal Service
Expand the definition of universal service to include
“advanced,” “enhanced,” and “information” services
such as Internet access.48 Widespread deployment of
broadband services, particularly in areas with high con
centrations of minority and low-income households, has
become a principal policy objective of the FCC.49 Expan
sion of the broadband network, and increased access to
it, is claimed to bring valuable new services to con
sumers, stimulate economic activity, improve national
productivity, and advance economic opportunity for all
Americans. Congress has explicitly charged the FCC to
“encourage the deployment on a reasonable and timely
basis” of broadband capabilities to “all Americans,” and
gave the FCC authority to “take immediate action to
accelerate deployment of such capability by removing
barriers to infrastructure investment,” if necessary.50 A
RAND study recommended that an expanded universalservice basic package include a “plain text message”
e-mail exchange program for all eligible households.51
Determining the value of expanding universal-service
support is beyond the scope of this report. However, we

46
See proposals of the majority of the ACEC (in the full report, “Overview
of Current State and Local Telecommunications Taxes in California,” above);
the National Governors’ Association (“Streamlining State Sales Tax Systems,”
a proposal to the ACEC, 1999, available at http://www.ecommercecommis
sion.org/document/NGAPolicy.doc); and the proposal by 12 telecommunica
t ions compani e s ( “ Pr oposal fo r St ate and Lo cal T a xa t ion of the
Telecommunications Industry,” Nov. 15, 1999, available at http://www.ecom
mercecommission.org/document/StateAndLocalTaxation124.doc).
47
Palladino and Mazer (2000).
48
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 requires the FCC to periodically
review the definition of “universal service” to reflect changes in technology
and market demand.
49
For an exploration of whether the racial, ethnic, and income composition
of an area actually affects the probability of broadband availability, after
controlling for demand and cost factors, see Prieger (2003).
50
Sections 706(a) and (b) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996.
51
Anderson, et al. (1995).
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note that many economists have argued strenuously
against expanding universal-service subsidies (for ex
ample, Crandall and Waverman, 2000). Another argu
ment often given for expanding the definition of “univer
sal service” is concern over future revenues if voice
traffic migrates to broadband Internet platforms.
Finance universal service from general fund revenues
similar to other welfare and social programs. Given that
universal service is essentially a welfare program,
telecommunications providers and customers should not
bear its burden. As discussed in the section on social and
economic consequences of existing telecommunications
tax policy, one cannot logically use the benefit principle
to support telecommunications-specific taxation for
universal service.
Finance universal service from flat-rate or per-line
charges instead of ad valorem charges. A flat-rate charge,
independent of the quantity or length of calls or other
connections, would result in fewer consumption distor
tions and a lower efficiency cost.
Eliminate universal-service subsidies altogether. The
most common arguments include the following: (1)
Competition and new technologies have lowered the cost
of telecommunications services, so that most people have
affordable access to basic telecommunications services.
(2) Justifications based on network externalities over
state the benefit to society of bringing marginal sub
scribers onto the network. (3) The government should not
select the services that receive subsidies and thereby
influence the path or speed of innovation. Universal-ser
vice subsidies discourage the deployment of new tech
nologies since they have to compete with existing sub
sidized technologies.
As discussed in the section on equity and efficiency, we are
not unsympathetic to some of these arguments. The last point
touches on dynamic inefficiency, which we discussed in that
same section.
Eliminate high-cost subsidies. Wireless and satellite
technology have lowered the cost of providing service to
rura l a nd pre vio us ly hi gh-c os t a re a s . As m a ny
economists have argued elsewhere (for example, Prieger
1998), subsidizing an area makes little sense compared
with subsidizing targeted individuals.
Federal Telecommunications Taxes
There have been several attempts to repeal the outdated and
burdensome 3 percent FET on telecommunications.
Administration
Various proposals have been offered to simplify adminis
tration and compliance with the multitude of telecommunica
tions taxes. These suggestions include having only one trans
action tax per state (or perhaps one local transaction tax as
well), one tax return per state, one audit level, uniform defini
tions, and 120 days’ lead time for implementing changes to the
base or rate.52

52

See footnote 46.
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Alternative Taxation
Replace a tax system that favors one form of telecom
munications service over another with a “bit tax,” in which the
amount of data transmitted is taxed regardless of the originating
or receiving technology.53 A bit tax is generally opposed due to
the technological difficulty of assessing it, the notion that it
taxes (and therefore impedes) the flow of information, and its
being perceived as a revenue-generating tool.
Conclusions and Recommendations
The main purpose of this report is twofold. First, we have
described the existing telecommunications tax system in the
state and presented the history, rationale, and structure of all
existing taxes, fees, and surcharges paid by service providers
and consumers. Second, we have examined the equity and
economic efficiency of the current system and some alterna
tives. In this section we summarize our findings regarding the
five key points mentioned at the outset of this report that have
guided our research. By exploring the costs of the current
system and a few alternatives, we hope to provide policymakers
with a clearer view of the implications of past and future
decisions about telecommunications taxation in the state. Al
though our chief objective is to present information rather than
to advocate particular reforms, we conclude by suggesting a
few apparent improvements our analysis points to.
Key Issues
Is the burden of the existing tax treatment of telecom
munications services and providers distributed equitably?
Whether we evaluate the distribution of the burden of cur
rent telecommunications taxes based on the benefit principle,
the ability-to-pay principle, or the horizontal-equity principle,
our conclusion is the same. The current system, based
predominantly on revenue taxation, is not equitable. According
to the benefit principle, the burden of a tax should be distributed
according to the benefits received from the government ac
tivities financed by the tax. Many of the taxes imposed on
telecommunications are revenue-based taxes, the burden of
which falls predominantly on consumers of telecommunica
tions services in proportion to their expenditures. However,
there is no evidence that these taxpayers benefit in greater
proportion from the goods and services financed by the taxes
and certainly not in proportion to expenditures.
The ability-to-pay principle holds that tax burdens should
be distributed according to taxpayers’ ability to pay. Because
the share of household income spent on telecommunications
services generally decreases as household income increases,
the burden of taxes imposed on the revenues from the sale of
services, including all of the federal, state and local taxes,
surcharges and fees discussed in this report, is distributed
regressively with respect to income, violating the ability-to-pay
principle.
The horizontal-equity principle calls for “equal treatment of
equals,” which means that taxpayers of equal ability to pay should
bear equal tax burdens. For the many taxes on telecommunications
services to satisfy this principle of equity would require that all
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The idea for a bit tax apparently originated with Cordell (1996). A bit
tax was suggested in a 1999 United Nations report, Human Development
Report 1999, as a funding mechanism to reduce technology gaps throughout
the world.
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taxpayers of similar incomes spend the same amount on
telecommunications. This is clearly not the case.
Does the existing tax system impose different tax bur
dens on the providers (or consumers) of similar services?
Essentially, this question is asking if the current tax system
discriminates on the basis of technology. In this era of conver
gence there are many alternatives to the traditional wireline
based “telephone call.” Examples include wireless or mobile
service, including cellular, PCS (personal communications ser
vices), and satellite, and various types of Internet telephony.
Our research shows that the tax burden does vary across
technologies.

Whether we evaluate the distribution of the
burden of current telecommunications taxes
based on the benefit principle, the ability-to-pay
principle, or the horizontal-equity principle,
our conclusion is the same. The current system,
based predominantly on revenue taxation, is
not equitable.
Traditional providers of telecommunications services,
such as telephone companies, are subject to a much broader
range of existing federal, state, and local taxes than are some
of their new competitors, such as cable or satellite providers.
Consumers of cable or satellite services do not pay the
federal excise tax (FET). Nor do they pay the numerous
federal and state taxes and charges to support universal
service. The largest potential “leakage” regarding voice
communications is Internet telephony. Internet-telephony
services escape all of the federal and state universal-service
taxes, the FET, and the local UUT (utility user tax), and
consequently enjoy a competitive advantage.
Another potential source of discriminatory tax treatment
is the local franchise fee. Cable companies pay franchise
fees for the privilege of providing specialized services as
well as for the right to use public rights-of-way to lay their
cables. In contrast, local exchange carriers (LECs) have
been exempted by the state from paying such fees.
Telecommunications companies are also treated differ
ently under California’s property tax laws. Currently, cable
television companies are locally assessed while most
telecommunications companies (LECs, CLECs, wireless)
are state-assessed. Although there is no evidence that the
current assessed values of either type company would
ch an ge s ign if icantly if their assessment s tatus w ere
switched, the perception of either current or future differ
ences may influence a firm’s investment in infrastructure.
There is little economic justification for these differences
in treatment among technologies. The section on equity and
efficiency points out that favoring one technology over
another may be to the detriment of consumer and producer
welfare over time. Any economic justification for differing
tax treatment depends on the demand for the final service
produced, not directly on the technology underlying the
service.
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Is the existing tax structure the most efficient means
of raising the current level of tax revenue?
Telecommunications taxes and charges raise the price of
telecommunications services relative to other goods and
services, and consumers respond by consuming fewer
telecommunications services. The result is what economists
refer to as excess burden — a loss of economic well-being
above and beyond the tax revenue collected. We estimate,
very conservatively, that the current set of telecommunica
tions taxes leads to a 4 percent efficiency loss, or excess
burden, in California.
The most efficient tax system is one that raises needed
revenue with the least excess burden possible. In order to
minimize overall excess burden, tax rates must be higher on
services for which demand is price-insensitive and lower on
services for which the demand is price-sensitive. Following
this rule, the excess burden of telecommunications taxes in
California can be significantly reduced by raising the effec
tive tax rate on revenues from local exchange access and
lowering the rate that applies to other services such as
long-distance and wireless services. Another implication of
inefficiency is that a more efficient tax system could raise
more tax revenue and do no more harm to consumers and
firms than the current system does.
The existing tax structure also results in a dynamic ef
ficiency loss due to discrimination among telecommunica
tions firms (based on the technology used to deliver telecom
munication services), or between telecommunications
companies and other companies. This tax discrimination
distorts the rates of return on investment across companies,
thereby influencing the growth of the telecommunications
industry and its various components.
Does the existing tax system distort the consumer’s
choice between competing telecommunications services
and technologies?
Economic theory suggests that differences in taxes on
co mp etin g teleco mm u n i ca tio n s s er v ices w ill aff ect
consumers’ choices. When taxes raise the relative price
consumers pay for certain goods or services, they respond
by reducing their consumption of the relatively higherpriced good or service and substituting others. Techno
logical change has introduced alternatives to traditional
telecommunications services, thereby providing more
choices for consumers and increasing their response to the
relatively high taxes on traditional services. For example,
Internet-telephony services escape all of the federal, state,
and local taxes, surcharges, and fees levied on traditional
telecommunications services; consequently, consumers of
telecommunications services, particularly interstate and in
ternational services, have an incentive to switch to Internetbased telephony to avoid the high combined tax rate.
There are currently limited data available to measure the
extent to which consumers are substituting Internet for tradi
tional telecommunications. In July 2000, an independent
analyst of the Web-based voice communication industry
estimated that roughly 15 million people in the United States
were using voice communication over the Internet, up from
5 million in 1999.54 This number is sure to increase further
with improvements in the technology of Internet telephony.
54
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Another consequence of concern to federal, state, and local
governments is the decline in revenue, as consumers switch
from taxed to untaxed services, and the potential impact on the
programs these taxes finance.
Does the existing tax system distort the location decisions
of telecommunication providers or consumers?
Location decisions by both businesses and households are
typically based on a wide array of factors. The availability of
telecommunications services and their cost are likely to factor
into the decision, although it is impossible to determine the
extent of their influence. However, it is logical to say that if all
else were equal across locations, including the availability of
telecommunications services, businesses and households
would choose the location that offers those services at least
cost. Therefore, the question of whether the tax system distorts
location choices becomes a question of whether the cost of
similar services varies across locations. Clearly, as we have
seen in “Overview of Current State and Local Telecommunica
tions Taxes in California” in the full report, the answer is yes.
Telecommunication costs vary from city to city and from
county to county in California due to variations in the local
UUT and local franchise fees. We found that the UUT rate alone
ranges from zero to 11 percent across California cities, and that
the base to which the tax applies also varies. Therefore, if all
else were equal, businesses and households would choose to
locate in no- or low-UUT cities. This choice would be especial
ly true of businesses that rely heavily on telecommunications
services and would lead to dynamic efficiency losses. Telecom
munications businesses themselves may also experience lower
costs in some California locations due to lower UUT rates and
lower local franchise fees.

C alifornia’s method of allocating sale s
from services and intangible property to the
s tat e f or ta xati on pu rp oses ma y n ot be
appropriate for telecommunications and
information services.
Our comparison of telecommunications taxes in California
with those in other large and neighboring states shows that
California, although it has more state taxes (which may raise
administrative and compliance costs for telecommunications
companies located here or doing business in the state), does not
impose a relatively higher tax burden on telecommunications.
Telecommunications taxes, therefore, probably play a negli
gible role in business or household decisions to choose to locate
in California.
Recommendations
In no specific order, we recommend the following. Some of
these recommendations can be implemented unilaterally by the
state. Others require California to cooperate with local govern
ments or with other states.
California should extend the manufacturers’ invest
ment credit (MIC) and sales tax exemption for new
equipment purchases to telecommunications com
panies.
State Tax Notes, September 15, 2003

As noted before, telecommunications companies are not
allowed to claim the manufacturers’ investment credit on their
equipment purchases. The primary purpose of the MIC and
sales tax exemption on equipment purchases is to avoid the
pyramiding of taxes that can occur when both the inputs used
to produce goods and services and the goods and services
themselves are subject to the tax. The COST study (COST
2002a) indicates that 14 states provide a sales tax exemption
for both manufacturers and telecommunications companies.
California provides a sales tax exemption only for certain new
corporations. Other corporations (if in an eligible SIC code)
obtain a 6 percent credit to be applied against their franchise
tax.
One rationale for excluding telecommunications companies
from claiming the MIC and sales tax exemption might be that
the services provided by telecommunications companies are
not subject to any sales tax. However, the services these com
panies provide are subject to a variety of telecommunicationsspecific taxes, fees, and surcharges that add up to more than the
state sales tax in some cases. More fundamentally, the MIC
serves as a business investment incentive. If the state provides
incentives to manufacturers to invest in capital, then there is no
reason why telecommunications companies should not also be
eligible. Given the importance of communications in the New
Economy, extending the MIC to telecommunications com
panies might benefit the economy even more than offering it to
manufacturing firms.55
California should reexamine the income apportion
ment and sourcing rules as they apply to telecom
munications and information services for taxation
purposes.
Are the current rules for corporate franchise and income
taxes appropriate for telecommunications services? All states
must cooperate to ensure that multistate income is being appor
tioned to the proper states to avoid double taxation. California’s
method of allocating sales from services and intangible proper
ty to the state for taxation purposes may not be appropriate for
telecommunications and information services. The “all or noth
ing” approach of allocating sales from services and intangibles
may not make sense in the “Information Age.” For example,
consider a company that has all of its employees and equipment
located in California but provides server space to customers
that are mainly located in other states. Under current rules, the
sales will all be allocated to California, because that is where
the direct costs of performance occur; no sales will be allocated
to other states.
This system may lead a company to locate its direct costs in
a state with a low income tax rate. On the other hand, such a
system may be desirable where it is difficult to identify the
location of customers, such as with the transfer of digitized
products. In such a case, identification of the costs of perfor
mance would be simpler.
Another issue concerning intangible assets is whether they
should be included in the property factor. Some informationage businesses have intangibles with a very high value. For
example, the wireless spectrum licenses of a telecommunica
tions company may be its most valuable asset.

55

See Nadiri and Nandi (2001).

783

(C) Tax Analysts 2003. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim copyright in any public domain or third party content.

Special Report / Viewpoint

Of course, it is often difficult to determine whether intangibles
are located within California (or anywhere else). However, licen
ses cover specific geographic areas. For other intangibles that
enable a service to be offered, the telecommunications company
may be able to apportion based on where the customers of the
service live (as determined by billing addresses, for example).
Given the significance of these assets to generating telecom
munications revenue, consideration should be given to whether,
and how, all or some intangibles should be included in the appor
tionment process.
One approach for examining the apportionment and sourc
ing issue would be to reopen the Franchise Tax Board’s 1997
project (see full report, paragraphs on 1997 draft apportion
ment regulations [pages 25-27]) to provide special apportion
ment rules for telecommunications, subscription television,
Internet access, and electronic information services. Alterna
tively, California could work with other states to update the
Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act so that
sourcing rules and the property factor are uniform and the
potential for double taxation is eliminated.
California should work with other states and the
federal government to establish new nexus guidelines
for the Information Age.
Federal P.L. 86-272 is out of date because it does not apply
to services or sales of intangible property. This law should be
broadened to cover intangibles, such as telecommunications
and Internet services, and extended to other types of taxes. The
states should determine if it is possible to work together to
derive a rule, or whether Congress needs to mandate the stan
dards. Updating P.L. 86-272 will be challenging because the
view of what constitutes a “taxable presence” often differs for
governments and businesses. Challenges also exist in writing
a law that will not result in confusion and litigation. For
example, S. 664 (107th Congress) uses the term “substantial
physical presence,” which is not a term that has been used by
the courts to describe nexus. Therefore, issues would likely
arise as to what “substantial” means.
California should, in cooperation with its local gov
ernments, simplify and consolidate the various taxes
and charges imposed on end-user revenues by local
jurisdictions and the Public Utilities Commission.
Extend the sales and use tax to telecommunications ser
vices. California does not apply sales and use taxes to telecom
munications services. However, local jurisdictions and the
PUC do impose various fees and taxes on such services. Exten
sion of the sales and use tax to telecommunications services
could be a simple and efficient way to replace the numerous
additional taxes and fees. Although this proposal does nothing
to improve the inequity of revenue taxation, it might lead to
more equitable treatment of vendors by looking at the nature
of the service provided rather than the nature of the company
(for example, regulated or not regulated). Of course, various
issues would need to be addressed, such as whether a telecom
munications sales tax could raise enough revenue to replace
existing taxes and fees, how the tax could effectively be
returned to local governments and the PUC, and whether the
tax could be effectively collected on services provided to
California residents by remote vendors.
Cities typically collect 1 percent of sales in taxes unless they
also have a local-option tax in effect. Most cities with a utility
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user tax would therefore lose revenue if the sales tax replaced
their UUT. However, a broader sales tax base, extended to other
services as well as telecommunications services, may make up
for the lost UUT revenue. A more detailed analysis would be
needed to ascertain the full revenue impact of such a substitu
tion.
Consolidate state and local taxes and charges. Another
option for simplifying state and local taxes and charges would
be to replace them with a single state utility tax or one state and
one local municipal utility tax. This approach has been taken
by other states, such as Florida and Illinois. While this method
would significantly reduce the filing requirements of telecom
munications companies doing business in California, there is a
trade-off between simplicity and efficiency. As noted before,
efficient taxation calls for different tax rates on different ser
vices.
Consider a flat-rate per-line charge. Consider financing
universal-service programs from flat-rate per-line charges in
stead of ad valorem charges. A flat-rate charge, independent of
the quantity or length of calls or other connections, would result
in fewer consumption distortions and a lower efficiency cost.
Substitute income tax funding. Another option to consider
is to eliminate the array of taxes and charges currently used to
fund universal service and instead finance these programs from
general fund revenues, as is done with other welfare and social
programs. Given that universal service is essentially a welfare
program, telecommunications providers and customers should
not bear its burden. One cannot logically use the benefit prin
ciple to support telecommunications-specific taxation for
universal service.
California should encourage local jurisdictions to
unify the local utility user tax.
The compliance burden on telecommunications companies
could be significantly reduced if local jurisdictions were to
adopt a uniform rate and base for the utility user tax. In
California, a significant complexity exists in the varying tax
bases used by more than 150 cities and counties that impose a
telephone user’s tax. Efforts to provide a uniform base and
definitions should be undertaken. Success in this area could
also lead to a single filing and reporting system.
In addition, should Congress repeal the federal excise tax,
the definitions used by local jurisdictions, in imposing a
telephone user’s tax, would no longer exist or need to be
maintained. The state could assist local jurisdictions in main
taining uniform definitions should this occur.
California should establish uniform assessment of
business property.
The assessed value of business property should not be
dependent upon who assesses it. Market-value assessment,
either by the BOE or a local assessor, would be the most
equitable and efficient method. Also, the allocation of the
property tax revenue from a particular property should not be
a function of who assesses it.
California should urge local governments to examine
their local franchise fees.
Local franchise fees should be set to cover no more than the
costs to local governments of managing public rights-of-way,
and not to fund general municipal budgets. Furthermore, with
different sets of rules applying to different types of providers
State Tax Notes, September 15, 2003
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and confusion over the meaning of terms (such as cable ser
vices), it may become increasingly challenging for local gov
ernments to manage public rights of way and obtain the neces
sary franchise fees to cover their costs of proper management.
Also, to the extent providers of telecommunications services
(broadly defined) are not equally subject to franchise fees, com
petitive advantages and disadvantages exist that can impede the
future development of new technologies and services with benefit
to users. All providers of telecommunication services should be
equally subject to franchise fees so as to avoid competitive ad
vantages that influence the future development of new techno
logies. The free franchise provided to telecommunications com
panies and the existing franchise fees charged by local
jurisdictions should be part of any debate on reform of telecom
munication taxes and fees.
California and other states should urge the federal gov
ernment to clarify issues regarding Internet telephony.
Currently, telephone calls placed over the Internet are not
subject to federal, state, or local taxes and charges and thus enjoy
a competitive advantage. Does the state want Internet telephony
to be used as a tax-avoidance strategy? As the quality of Internet
telephony improves, more consumers will switch, which may lead
to decreased economic efficiency and reduced government
revenues. The only efficient and equitable choices would appear
to be to try to tax it or to move toward exempting all telecom
munications services from taxation.
California and other states should urge the federal gov
ernment to clarify issues regarding cable telephony.
Although the FCC has ruled on the legal and regulatory status
of cable modem service, telephony implemented by cable service
operators is a different technology. Is it subject to local franchise
fees? If the telephone service is implemented using switched
circuits, like the public telephone network, then the answer is “no”;
divisions of cable companies providing switched circuit service
fall under the same rules as any other competitive local exchange
carrier, and are exempt from franchise fees. However, if the service
is implemented using Internet Protocol (IP) over the cable
company’s broadband network (as will increasingly be the case),
then it is not clear whether the service is subject to local franchise
fees, because the regulatory classification of IP telephony is
generally unclear (whether implemented by cable companies or
by other communications firms).56 Is the property used to provide
the service to be state or locally assessed? What if the same
network delivers both telephone service and television program
ming? These are issues that need to be resolved, keeping in mind
both equity and efficiency consequences.
California and other states should monitor and work
with the federal government in its efforts to restrict state
and local tax systems.
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There is currently no legal basis for the application of franchise fees to
cable IP telephony in the state, because the FCC has not declared that such
services are “cable services.” However, the FCC has also declined to classify
cable IP telephony as an “information service,” which would remove any doubt
that franchise fees could apply to the service. The indeterminacy of the
applicability of franchise fees, state, or local property tax assessment, and
whether universal-service fees apply to IP telephony (whether implemented by
cable companies or other communications firms) will likely persist until the
FCC classifies the service one way or the other.
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Maintaining a competitively neutral tax system in California
may require expanding the tax base to include previously untaxed
services, such as Internet access. Currently, federal and state
moratoriums prevent such reforms. California policymakers
should monitor efforts at the federal level to impose further
restrictions on the tax bases of state and local governments, due
to the loss of control produced by such restrictions. Consideration
should be given to working with other states to create uniform tax
rules and definitions that may alternatively address some of the
concerns that lead Congress to impose restrictions on state and
local tax bases.
California should work with local governments to pro
vide uniform relief for low-income individuals and
households.
The taxes imposed on telecommunications services are regres
sive: Taxes represent a larger percentage of a low-income
household’s income than a high-income household’s. A few cities
offer UUT exemptions for low-income individuals. Some also
provide relief from statewide surcharges, but the relief is not
consistent and in some cases may not be sufficient. Telecom
munications tax- and fee-reform discussions should consider
whether more uniform relief should be provided for low-income
individuals.
Outside the scope of the present study, a commission has been
convened to examine state tax policy for a more service- and
information-oriented economy. In September 2000, SB 1933 was
enacted (Chapter 619). This legislation called for formation of a
Commission on Tax Policy in the New Economy to “examine the
impact of Internet and other forms of electronic technology on
various types of taxes.” The commission issued a preliminary
report in November 2002;57 its final report is due this December.
Conclusion
Telecommunications represents a major path by which fu
ture economic growth will travel. If developing the telecom
munications infrastructure is a goal of state economic policy,
then tax policy should support this goal by encouraging, or at
least not discouraging, investment in the state’s telecom
munications industry. As policymakers at all levels of govern
ment confront the challenge of reforming our tax system to
encourage new technology and broad access to various
telecommunications services, including Internet access, while
at the same time addressing the needs of tax equity and revenue
sufficiency, they must first have a clear understanding of the
current tax system and the incentives (or disincentives) it
creates. Our study takes this important first step along the path
to tax reform that will lay the groundwork for more in-depth
analysis of the equity and efficiency consequences of potential
reform measures.
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Glossary
Technical and economic terms and acronyms used in the
report are defined here for reference.
Ad Valorem Tax
A tax levied in proportion to the value of a good or service;
used synonymously with “revenue tax” in this report.
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Administrative Simplicity
The state of a tax being simple and inexpensive to administer
and collect.
Apportionment
The assignment of taxable income to taxing jurisdictions
(typically states). California uses a four-factor apportionment
formula consisting of the sum of a payroll factor, a property
factor, and a double-weighted sales factor. Each factor is a ratio
of a California amount to a total amount everywhere. Appor
tionment results in a specific percentage of a company’s in
come that is taxed in the state.
BOE
California State Board of Equalization.
Cable Modem Service
A broadband Internet-access service offered by cable com
panies. A cable modem is a device that enables a PC to connect
to a local cable TV line and receive data at about 1.5 megabits
per second (Mbps).
Cable Telephony
Telephony services offered over a cable network. Cable
telephony is typically offered over a combination of optical
fiber and coaxial cable plant. Cable telephony can be imple
mented as a circuit-switched service using installed cable lines
or resold traditional local phone lines, or as an Internet Protocol
cable telephony service offered over the coaxial cable lines
themselves. The latter is known as voice-over cable (VoCable),
and is closely related to the Internet-telephony services. The
call path for a circuit-switched service is similar to an LEC’s
offering, where the cable company’s coaxial cable and fiber
network replaces the local wireline loop.
CHCF
California High-Cost Fund. A program to keep subscribers’
rates down in high-cost areas. CHCF-A subsidizes 17 small
ILECs (see entry). CHCF-B subsidizes the largest ILECs.
CLEC
Competitive local exchange carrier. A company that pro
vides exchange-access services in competition with an estab
lished telephone local exchange carrier.
Coaxial Cable
The kind of copper cable used by cable TV companies
between the community antenna and user homes and busi
nesses. It is called “coaxial” because it includes one physical
channel that carries the signal surrounded (after a layer of
insulation) by another concentric physical channel.
COST
Council On State Taxation. COST is a nonprofit association
based in Washington, D.C., which has an independent mem
bership of more than 540 major multistate corporations from
all sectors of industry engaged in interstate and international
business.
CPUC
California Public Utilities Commission.
Distortionary Taxation
Taxation that distorts the relative prices of inputs (such as
capital, land, or labor) or outputs (such as various kinds of
telecommunications services).
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DSL
Digital subscriber line. DSL is a technology for bringing
high-bandwidth information over ordinary copper telephone
lines. XDSL refers to different variations of DSL, such as
ADSL (asynchronous DSL), HDSL (high-speed DSL), SDSL
(symmetric DSL) and RADSL (Rate-Adaptive DSL). DSL
offers data at rates up to 6.1 Mbps, enabling continuous trans
mission of audio and motion video. More typically, individual
connections provide from 1.544 Mbps to 512 kbps downstream
and about 128 kbps upstream. A DSL line can carry both data
and voice signals, and the data part of the line is continuously
connected. A DSL line can also carry multiple voice channels,
enabling several virtual lines, each with its own phone number.
Economic Efficiency
An economic outcome is efficient (in the sense used by
economists) if no economic agent (e.g., a consumer or a firm)
can be made better off without making another agent worse off.
This definition of efficiency is also called “Pareto efficiency.”
Efficient outcomes maximize the total economic benefits
(“total surplus,” in economic jargon) to all agents in sum; if
additional benefits were possible, then they could be distributed
to make an agent better off without taking anything away from
other agents. A final (albeit colloquial) way to describe efficien
cy is that efficient outcomes make the size of the “economic
pie” as large as possible (regardless of how the pie is dis
tributed).
Efficiency
See Economic Efficiency, Productive Efficiency, and Tax
Efficiency.
FET
Federal excise tax. A tax levied by the federal government
on all telecommunications services. The proceeds from the
FET do not fund any particular telecommunications-related
program; instead, they are part of the general federal tax
system.
FTB
Franchise Tax Board. The FTB collects state personal in
come taxes and bank and corporation taxes for the State of
California.
Headend
The facility at a local cable TV office that originates and
communicates cable TV services and cable modem services to
subscribers.
High-Speed Services
Those services with over 200-kbps capability in at least one
direction. Often used synonymously with broadband services.
ILEC
Incumbent local exchange carrier. The telephone company
that traditionally provided service as a regulated utility in a
given area. Newer LECs in the same area are called CLECs.
Information Service
The offering of a capability for generating, acquiring, stor
ing, transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making
available information via telecommunications (as defined in 47
U.S.C. section 153(20)).
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InterLATA Call
A long-distance call originated and completed within differ
ent LATAs. Also known as “long-haul long-distance.”
Internet Telephony
IP telephony that uses the Internet. See IP Telephony.
Interstate Services
Services for which the communication or transmission
originates in any state, territory, possession of the United
States, or the District of Columbia and terminates in another
state, territory, possession, or the District of Columbia. In
addition, under the FCC’s rules, if over 10 percent of the traffic
carried over a private or WATS line is interstate, then the
revenues and costs generated by the entire line are classified as
interstate. For purposes of universal-service funding, interna
tional services originating or termination in the U.S. are also
“interstate.” The FCC has determined that the following ser
vices are interstate services: “cellular telephone and paging
services; mobile radio services; operator services; PCS; access
to interexchange service; special access; wide area telephone
service (WATS); toll-free services; 900 services; MTS; private
line; telex; telegraph; video services; satellite services; and
resale services” (Federal Communications Commission, In the
Matter of Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service:
Report And Order, CC Docket No. 96-45, May 7, 1997, at 780).
Payphone service providers (“payphone aggregators”) must
also contribute unless they qualify for the de minimis exemp
tion. Satellite and video service providers must contribute to
universal service only to the extent that they are providing
interstate telecommunications services. Thus, for example,
entities providing, on a common carrier basis, video conferenc
ing services, channel service or video distribution services to
cable headends would contribute to universal service. Entities
providing open video systems (OVS), cable leased access, or
direct broadcast satellite (DBS) services would not be required
to contribute on the basis of revenues derived from those
services.
IntraLATA Call
A long-distance call originated and completed within a
LATA. Also known as “short-haul long-distance” or “local
toll.”
Intrastate Services
Local and long-distance calls that do not cross a state line.
Any IntraLATA service is an intrastate service (with a few, rare
exceptions).
IP
Internet Protocol, the TCP/IP standard protocol for informa
tion passed across the Internet.
IP Telephony
Internet Protocol telephony, a general term for the techno
logies that use the Internet Protocol’s packet-switched connec
tions to exchange voice, fax, and other forms of information
that have traditionally been carried over the dedicated circuitswitched connections of the PSTN. IP telephony may be carried
over the Internet, cable-based networks, or private networks.
LATA
Local access and transport areas were created by the
Modified Final Judgment and define the geographic area over
which the LEC may provide toll calls. The area may be smaller
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than that covered by a long-distance area code. Even though an
LEC’s territory may cover many LATAs (PacBell’s in Califor
nia includes 10 LATAs), the LEC may not provide calls that
cross LATA boundaries; such interLATA traffic must be carried
by IXCs. With rare exceptions, LATAs do not cross state lines.
LEC
Local exchange company. A telephone company offering
basic exchange access service.
Local Loop
The “last mile” of the telephone network. The local loop is
the wired connection from a telephone company’s central
office to its customers’ telephones at homes and businesses.
This connection is usually on a pair of copper wires called a
twisted pair.
MIC
Manufacturers’ investment credit. A 6 percent franchise and
income tax credit on purchases of equipment used in manufac
turing and research and development activities available in
California. Providers of telecommunications services are not
eligible for the MIC on their equipment purchases.
Opportunity Cost
The value of the most highly valued forgone alternative. The
opportunity cost of using an asset to produce good X, for
example, is that the asset owner must give up the opportunity
to use the asset to produce good Y. Sound economic decisions
are made on the basis of opportunity costs.
PCS
Personal communications services, a wireless phone ser
vice. Like cellular telephone service, PCS is for mobile users
and requires a number of antennas to blanket an area of
coverage. As a user moves around, the phone signal is picked
up by the nearest antenna and forwarded to a base station that
connects to the wired telephony network. It generally requires
more cell transmitters for coverage then cellular service, but
has the advantage of fewer blind spots.
Productive Efficiency
An allocation of inputs such that the only way to increase
the output of one good is to reduce the output of another good.
In this sense, no inputs are wasted.
PSP
Payphone service provider.
PSPE
Payphone Service Providers Enforcement program. The
PSPE was established by the CPUC to ensure that payphone
consumer safeguards set forth in the tariffs for the service
territories of Pacific Bell and Verizon are being followed. These
consumer safeguards included signage requirements, rate caps
for intraLATA, interLATA, and directory assistance calls
within California. Compliance is enforced by inspections of the
payphones and by advising the local telephone companies to
disconnect noncompliant payphones. The program is funded
by per-line charges paid by all PSPs.
PSTN
Public Switched Telephone Network.
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SLC
Subscriber line charge, a monthly charge approved by the
FCC for subscriber line cost recovery that appears on every
phone bill for local service. The money is paid to the local
phone companies. The charge does not vary with usage.

the form or content of the information as sent and received (47
U.S.C. section 153(43)). Thus, an entity provides telecom
munications only when it both provides a transparent transmis
sion path and it does not change the form or content of the
information.

Sourcing
Sourcing for transaction tax purposes is assigning a taxable
transaction (for example, a mobile telephone call) to a taxing
jurisdiction (for example, a state or a city).

Telecommunications Service
The federal legal definition for telecommunications service
is the offering of telecommunications for a fee directly to the
public, or to such classes of users as to be effectively available
to the public, regardless of facilities used (47 U.S.C. section
153(46)). Most states have their own legal definitions.58

Switching
The controlling or routing of signals in circuits to execute
logical or arithmetic operations or to transmit data between
specific points in a network. Switching may be performed by
electronic, optical, or electromechanical devices.
TA96
The Telecommunications Act of 1996. Public Law No.
104-104 (Feb. 8, 1996).
Tax Efficiency
The extent to which a tax distorts economic decisionmaking and resource allocation. See Economic Efficiency.
Tax Equity
Refers to a fundamental sense of fairness in the incidence
of the tax system, or who bears the burden of the taxes.
Tax Situs
In this context, the location of property, for purposes of
determining whether a given property tax applies. For example,
a regulated telephone corporation’s property with a tax situs in
California is subject to California state property tax.
Telecommunications
The transmission, between or among points specified by the
user, of information of the user’s choosing, without change in

Telephony
The technology associated with the electronic transmission
of voice, fax, or other information between distant parties using
systems historically associated with the telephone. Techno
logi cal convergence has made the distinction between
telephony and telecommunications difficult and less important.
UDITPA
Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act, which
provides uniform rules for apportioning income for state in
come tax purposes.
ULTS
Universal Lifeline Telephone Service. A universal-service
program in California.
User Cost of Capital
The opportunity cost that an owner incurs as a consequence
of owning and using an asset, or of putting it to one productive
use over other potential uses.
UUT
Utility user tax.

✰

58
See the Tax Cybrary’s list of state definitions at http://www.vertexinc.com/
cybrary/telecom/def_by_state.asp.
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